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The economic miracle achieved in recent decades by the Republic of China
(ROC) on Taiwan' has received widespread attention. 2 Discussion of this devel-
opment often focuses on Taiwan's program for export-oriented growth. Less
attention has been directed to Taiwan's political system, 4 and still less to Tai-
wan's banking system. 5 Taiwan's success in export-driven economic growth has
created pressure not only for political reform and democratization, but also for
reform of the antiquated, unruly, and inadequate financial system.
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1. Following the victory of the Chinese Communist Party in 1949, the administration of the
ROC was moved to Taiwan where it has remained. The ROC has never renounced its claim to be the
sole legitimate government of all China, and so Taiwan views itself not as an independent country but
as the largest region of China under control of the ROC today. In this article, however, references to
Taiwan should be interpreted as references to the ROC on Taiwan.
2. See, e.g., R. HOFHEINZ, JR. & K. CALDER, THE EAST ASIA EDGE (1982); S.W.Y. Kuo, G.
RANIs & J.C.H. Fbi, THE TAIWAN SUCCESS STORY (1981); K.T. Li, THE EVOLUTION OF POLICY BEHIND
TMAWAN'S DEVELOPMENT SUCCESS (1988); T. GOLD, STATE AND SOCIETY IN THE TAIWAN MIRACLE
(1986); R. WADE, GOVERNING THE MARKET: ECONOMIC THEORY AND THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN
EAST ASIAN INDUSTRIALIZATION (1990).
3. See, e.g., THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE NEW ASIAN INDUSTRIALISM (F.C. Deyo ed. 1987).
4. "Work on political and social processes [in newly industrialized countries of Asia such as
Taiwan], and how they related to economic processes, has hardly begun." Winckler & Greenhalgh,
Analytical Issues and Historical Episodes, in CONTENDING APPROACHES TO THE POLITICAL ECONOMY
OF TAIWAN 3 (E. Winckler & S. Greenhalgh eds. 1988).
5. R. WADE, supra note 2, at 159. Such coverage as the ROC financial system has received has
focused on economic or foreign investment perspectives, and so minimized the significance of
cultural, historical, political, or social factors within the system. See, e.g., Wang & Yang, Financial
Institutions in Taiwan: An Analysis of the Regulatory Scheme, 4 J. CHIN. L. 3 (1990); Liu, Financial
Developments and Foreign Investment Strategies in Taiwan-A Legal and Policy Perspective, 25 INT'L
LAW. 69 (1991).
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The pressure for banking reform in the ROC has come from both inside and
outside Taiwan. Until recently, ROC policy has been for the government to
dominate the banking system, and for the banking system to dominate the fi-
nancial system. ROC authorities tried to ignore demand from local investors for
the right to compete freely with government-owned banks. For decades, lack of
adequate financial services from regulated institutions has fostered the growth of
a huge informal6 or underground financial system. 7 Furthermore, demands from
the United States for equal competitive opportunities in Taiwan for U.S. com-
panies, including banks, insurance companies, and securities firms, has been a
contentious issue between the two countries for years. 8 If Taiwan's financial
markets can be liberalized and internationalized, it will have a direct impact on
U.S. banks, insurance companies, and brokerage firms either doing business or
hoping to do business in Taiwan.
In recent years, the ROC government has been more receptive to external and
internal pressures for reform of the domestic financial system. 9 With increasing
democratization of the government in Taiwan, it is likely that the government
will be more responsive to popular demand for improved financial services. The
ROC no longer enjoys diplomatic recognition from its major trading partners-
the United States, Japan, and the European Community (EC)--but its ties to the
international financial system are in some sense surrogates for diplomatic rela-
tions. 0 Leaders in Taiwan seem to appreciate the importance of integrating
Taiwan into the international financial system and have adopted policies to make
Taiwan an East Asian international financial center in the decades to come.11
6. "Informal economy" is defined as one that is unregulated by the institutions of society in a
legal and social environment in which similar activities are regulated. Castells & Portes, The World
Underneath: The Origins, Dynamics, and Effects of the Informal Economy, in THE INFORMAL ECON-
OMY: STUDIES IN ADVANCED AND LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 12 (L. Portes, M. Castells & L. Benton
eds. 1989).
7. This informal financial system includes loan sharks, underground investment houses, post-
dated checks, builder's mortgages, intercorporate loans, family credit, neighborhood loan circles,
and margin finance. Kaye, Pains of Adolescence, FAR. E. ECON. REV., Jan. 25, 1990, at 5 1. See infra
text section I.B. for a discussion of the informal financial system.
8. Kaplan, Russin, Vecchi & Parker, National Treatment Issues Affecting Branches of Foreign
Banks in the Republic of China on Taiwan (June 8, 1984) [hereinafter Kaplan].
9. Kaye, supra note 7, at 50. In the last three years, ROC authorities have relinquished significant
control over foreign exchange rates and interest rates; granted licenses to new securities broker/dealers;
permitted direct foreign investment in the Taiwan Stock Exchange; permitted expanded foreign bank
operations in the domestic market; permitted expanded foreign insurance company operations in the
domestic market; begun the privatization of major government-owned commercial banks; and granted
licenses to new privately-owned commercial banks. See infra text section III.
10. Chan, The Mouse That Roared: Taiwan's Management of Trade Relations with the United
States, 20 COMP. POL. STUD. 251, 282-85 (1987). For a general discussion of the close relationship
between private banking and national sovereignty issues, see generally B. COHEN, IN WHOSE IN-
TEREST?: INTERNATIONAL BANKING AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY (1986).
11. The ROC Act for Offshore Banking Operations was enacted on December 12, 1983, and
established an offshore banking system. See An Act for Offshore Banking Operations, E. ASIAN ExEc.
REP., May 15, 1984, at 23 (translated by Lee & Li). Offshore banking operations have been con-
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Taiwan's leaders also work to avoid conflicts in relations with the United States,
and have opened some local financial markets to competition from U.S. com-
panies in response to threats of restricted access to U.S. markets. 12 Major re-
forms have recently been made in the ROC Banking Law and Securities and
Exchange Law, and reforms of the Insurance Law are currently being discussed.
While this trend is encouraging, underlying institutional and political prob-
lems remain unsolved. These lurking structural problems may seriously impede
current reforms, although they are not likely to frustrate completely reform
efforts. Political problems include the slow, hesitant pace of democratic reform
and the continuing domination of the national political agenda by the Nationalist
Party, the Kuomintang (KMT). 13 The KMT exercises wide powers outside the
formal institutions of government and curtailing its ability to manipulate and
frustrate what is ostensibly official government policy will require more than
narrow reform of government institutions. 14 At an institutional level, decades of
inadequate financial services have created and sustained a massive informal
financial system.' 5 Successive crises periodically arise in this informal sector
which threaten to destabilize the entire financial system.' 6 While authorities
tackled the crises as they arose, they have yet to address the root causes of the
informal financial system. Until the financial system becomes more responsive to
demand and until the ROC regulatory system operates with more authority, the
informal financial system will remain a potential threat to the safety and sound-
ness of banking and finance in Taiwan.
This article first sketches the existing institutional and regulatory framework
within which banks and other financial institutions operate in Taiwan. The pri-
mary focus is on the banking industry, with some reference to developments in
related financial sectors such as securities or insurance. Section II discusses the
pressures from within and without Taiwan that encourage reform of the ROC
banking system. Section III outlines recent changes in ROC law designed to
implement official policies favoring liberalization and internationalization of the
financial system. Section IV argues that the prospects for financial reform and
ducted on a small scale ever since. Taiwan hopes to link call market with Singapore, Reuters Money
Rep., Oct. 15, 1990.
12. McGregor, Taiwan Runs Giant U.S. Lobbying Effort to Preserve Vital Economic Relation-
ship, Asian Wall St. J. Weekly, Oct. 30, 1989, at 2.
13. The Upcoming Elections in Taiwan: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Asian and Pacific
Affairs and the Report of the U.S. Cong. Observer Delegation to Taiwan of the House Comm. on
Foreign Affairs, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1989) (statement of David W. Tsai, President, Center for
Taiwan International Relations) [hereinafter Election Hearings].
14. N.T. Wu, The Politics of A Regime Patronage System: Mobilization and Control within an
Authoritarian Regime 16 (1987) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Chicago).
15. R.H.C. Ho, THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM IN TAIWAN, REPUBLIC OF CHINA: ITS FUNCTION AND
OPERATION 13 (1981).
16. The most notable recent examples are the Cathay scandal in 1985 and the phenomena of
underground investment companies in the late 1980s. See infra notes 51-54, notes 74-78 and
accompanying text.
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internationalization are linked to the prospects for political reform in Taiwan.
The ROC is entering a period of political transformation, the outcome of which
will be uncertain for many years to come. If the reforms produce a multiparty
democracy and a strong legal system like those of the United States, then the
regulation of financial institutions in the ROC may be conducted primarily
through the legal system. If the reforms produce democracy like that of Japan,
in which one party persistently dominates and regulation takes place through
informal bureaucratic mechanisms largely outside legal review, then the ROC
legal system will play a smaller role in regulating financial institutions. The
article concludes with the suggestion that bureaucratic informalism along the
lines practiced in Japan is a more likely outcome in Taiwan than a highly legal-
istic regulatory system such as is found in the United States. If that proves
correct, then liberalization and internationalization of banking and finance in
Taiwan will likely remain superficial and only partially effective.
I. The Existing Legal and Institutional Framework
A. RECENT BACKGROUND TO CONTEMPORARY
PROBLEMS IN BANKING REGULATION
Official ROC policies concerning the regulation of banks in Taiwan have been
strongly influenced by historical events. 1 7 The first modem Chinese commercial
bank was established on mainland China in 1896.18 Until World War II, how-
ever, ROC regulation of banking in China was subject to considerable interfer-
ence from foreign banks operating outside the control of Chinese authorities in
the foreign concessions. 19 After World War II, civil war and hyperinflation
impeded the development of a sound financial system in China. 20 Taiwan was a
Japanese colony from 1895 until 1945 when it was retroceded to China and came
under KMT control. Following the KMT's defeat on mainland China and its
retreat to Taiwan in 1949, the KMT focused its domestic policy on taming
inflation and achieving economic survival.21
Fearing a loss of autonomy in national financial and economic policies, the
KMT has not allowed foreign banks free access to domestic financial markets,
17. STAFF STUDY PREPARED FOR THE USE OF THE JOINT ECON. COMM., RESTORING INTERNATIONAL
BALANCE: THE TAIWAN ECONOMY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE, S. REP. No. 59, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess., at 22 (1987) [hereinafter S. REP. No. 59]. See also K. Fields, Developmental Capitalism and
Industrial Organization: Business Groups and the State in Korea and Taiwan (unpublished Ph.D.
thesis, University of California at Berkeley 1990, at 147).
18. This was the Imperial Bank of China, which no longer exists. PEAT, MARWICK, BANKING IN
TAIWAN 3 (1986). The oldest modem Chinese bank still in existence is the International Commercial
Bank of China, organized in 1907 as the Ta Ch'ing Bank.
19. T.H.S. Wan, Internationalization and Modernization of Banking in the Republic of China
(unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Queen Mary/Westfield College, University of London, expected submis-
sion, 1992).
20. S.P.S. Ho, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF TAIWAN, 1860-1970, at 104 (1978).
21. K.T. LI, supra note 2, at 39.
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nor has it allowed direct foreign competition directly with local banks in pro-
viding most services. Rather, foreign bank participation in the domestic market
has been limited to filling the gaps left by local banks. Even though such par-
ticipation is potentially profitable, 22 the authorized scope of business of foreign
banks in Taiwan remains restricted by regulations.
23
The KMT strategy of rigid, conservative financial policies combined with
highly intrusive government regulation of banks, including the allocation of
credit to foster economic development and political alliances, has its origins in
the hyperinflation of the 1940s. As the KMT's control over China's fiscal re-
sources eroded during the civil war preceding the KMT defeat by the Commu-
nists in 1949, the KMT regime was forced to rely on inflationary note issue to
finance its operations. KMT leaders believed that inflation, which rose to a 3,000
percent annual rate in 1949, contributed decisively to their defeat on the main-
land. After their retreat to Taiwan, KMT leaders implemented stringent anti-
inflation policies, and resolved never to lose control of ROC financial institutions
and resources again.
24
The conservatism of ROC financial policy may be justified by references to a
desire to maintain the safety and soundness of the banking system, but such an
explanation fails to address the fundamental paradox of financial regulation in
Taiwan. This highly intrusive and oppressive regulation of banks has been ac-
companied by an apparent disregard for the growth of the informal financial
system.25 Safety and soundness has therefore not been the primary concern of
regulators, nor has facilitating a free flow of credit to the small and medium-sized
businesses that have been the backbone of Taiwan's development. 26 Taiwan's
economic miracle has been achieved as much in spite of as because of its
financial system. The system has provided a limited quantity of credit on pref-
22. In fact, foreign bank operations in Taiwan are not always profitable. Foreign banks in Taiwan
heavily involved in extending credit in the early 1980s sustained heavy losses during the recession
that lasted from 1982-1985. Many have curtailed their lending operations in favor of fee-based
services, or left Taiwan altogether. Because foreign banks have very restricted access to the consumer
banking services market in Taiwan, foreign banks do not have many options to diversify beyond
commercial lending and fee-based services. See Mark & Owens, Taiwan's Market Losing Its Appeal
for Foreign Banks, Asian Wall St. J. Weekly, Sept. 10, 1990, at 1.
23. Implementation of the Taiwan Relations Act: Hearing and Markup Before the H.R. Comm.
on Foreign Aff. and Its Subcomm. on Human Rights and Int'l Organizations and on Asian and Pacific
Affairs, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1986) (statement of David Dean, director, American Institute in
Taiwan); ORG. FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION & DEV., FINANCIAL SYSTEMS AND FINANCIAL REGULA-
TION IN DYNAMIC ASIAN ECONOMIES (1990) [hereinafter OECD].
24. R. WADE, supra note 2, at 167; K. Fields, supra note 17, at 147.
25. Kaye, supra note 7, at 50.
26. Taiwan's private sector is composed almost entirely of small, light industrial and trading firms which are thinly
capitalized, with fewer than 50 employees and less than U.S. $1.5 million in annual sales. These businesses are
largely self-financed, or financed through family networks. Because of the caution shown by major lenders,
leverage is not high.
Although the island economy has boomed since the early 1960s, there has been relatively little consolidation of
small firms into larger ones. Mergers are rare in Taiwan, as are bankruptcies, and there is a strong tendency for
small finns to persist and grow modestly over time.
S. REP. No. 59, supra note 17, at 10.
WINTER 1991
912 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
erential terms for designated recipients, such as government-owned enterprises,
while the majority of businesses were left to fend for themselves in informal
credit markets.27
Authorities originally tolerated the growth of informal financial institutions
because credit from regulated sources was manifestly inadequate to meet the
needs of Taiwan's booming economy. Since the mid-1980s, however, conditions
in Taiwan's financial markets have changed dramatically. A chronic credit short-
age was supplanted by excess liquidity and wild speculation in the stock market,
in real estate, in underground investment companies, and even in an underground
futures market.2 s Strong export sales combined with a declining rate of local
investment to create cash balances in excess of opportunities for investment and
a higher level of national foreign exchange reserves than any country in the world
except Japan. Efforts by regulators to stem the tide of speculation were largely
ineffective, in part because the entrenched informal financial system now defied
simple attempts at regulation. 29
B. BANKS AND OTHER FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
Banks dominate the financial system of Taiwan and dwarf other participants in
terms of the volume of financial assets handled.3 ° In addition to the banking
system (in which foreign banks have been allowed to play a limited but important
role), the financial system of Taiwan includes bills finance houses, trust and
investment companies, insurance companies, a stock exchange, and the informal
financial system. The most developed institutions, such as banks, the money
market, and the informal financial system, deal with short- and medium-term
credit. Institutions for long-term credit and investment are less developed or, like
27. Id.; Winn, Taiwan Ends Penalties for Bad Checks in Move to Reform Its Financial System,
E. ASIAN ExEc. REP., Aug. 15, 1986, at 9.
28. From 1987 to 1989, futures trading was a popular form of gambling in Taiwan. Underground
futures traders operated as bookmakers, taking bets from the public and then paying out based on
price fluctuations in organized futures markets in Japan and the United States. Regulations aimed at
cleaning up futures trading in Taiwan will not establish a local futures exchange, but will seek to
guarantee that customers' orders are actually transmitted to the foreign exchanges where the price
quotes originate. McGregor, Taiwan Taking Steps to Bring Legitimacy to Futures Industry, Asian
Wall St. J. Weekly, Dec. 19, 1990, at 1.
29. For example, in 1989, Finance Minister Shirley Kuo tried to curb rampant speculation on the
Taiwan Stock Exchange by introducing a tax on stock transactions (both purchases and sales), but
was forced to reduce the tax to nominal levels in the face of strong public protest. Moore, High-Stakes
Shakeout, FAR E. EcON. REV., DEC. 14, 1989, AT 114. Following the tax policy turnaround, the stock
market continued to climb until it hit a high of 12,495.34 on February 10, 1990.
30. In 1980, banks accounted for 75 percent of all financial claims, while nonbank financial
institutions (such as trust and investment companies, bills finance houses, insurance companies)
accounted for only 7 percent. Corporate stock accounted for only 13 percent while government and
private bonds, notes, and bills accounted for 6 percent. R. WADE, supra note 2, at 159. In 1991,
however, there has been a dramatic increase in the number of government bonds issued as the ROC
government embarks on a major program of development projects, Baum, Paper Chase, FAR E.
ECON. REV., July 25, 1991, at 45.
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the stock market, are dominated by speculators and provide little assistance to
most businesses. Conservative fiscal policies to prevent government deficits have
hindered the development of a government bond market. 31 Long-term savings
vehicles such as life insurance and pension plans are not well accepted by a
public that, until recently at least, relied on extended families to provide financial
security during hard times or old age. 32 Although the stock market is well
established, insider trading is rampant. Most local investors are animated by
speculative motives and do not hold investments long-term.
The major commercial banks in Taiwan are also licensed to act as savings
banks (which have the power to underwrite securities) and operate trust depart-
ments, creating the possibility of "universal" banking similar to that developed
in Germany, although this possibility has not been realized.33 These banks have
the power to take deposits, make loans, discount bills and notes, issue letters of
credit, invest in bonds, and underwrite securities. 34 Various governmental units
still controlled the major commercial banks operating in Taiwan in 1990. 31 In
addition, three privately-owned commercial banks 36 were operating in 1990, as
well as thirty-seven foreign bank branches and eighteen foreign bank represen-
tative offices.
37
31. OECD, supra note 23.
32. Shea, Financial Development in Taiwan: A Macro Analysis, in THE ROLE OF FINANCE IN
ECONOMIC GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT: JAPAN, KOREA & TAIWAN (H. Patrick & Y.C. Park eds.,
forthcoming).
33. R. WADE, supra note 2, it 264; BANKING COMMITTEE, AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE IN
THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA, FINANCIAL SERVICES REFORM IN THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON TAIWAN 2
(1987): see also J. ZYSMAN, GOVERNMENTS, MARKETS AND GROWTH 261 (1983).
34. Banking Law art. 71 (as amended July 17, 1989) provides that a commercial bank may:
accept checking, demand, and time deposits; extend short- and medium-term loans; discount bills
and notes; invest in bonds and notes; handle remittances; accept drafts and issue letters of credit;
provide guarantees; act as collecting and paying agent; act as agent in the sale of government and
corporate stocks and bonds; conduct warehousing, custody, and agency business in relation to
authorized activities; and also conduct other business if so authorized. Article 78 of the Banking law
provides that a savings bank may provide many of the same services, although deposit taking is
limited to savings, time, and demand deposits; savings banks are also authorized to underwrite
government or corporate securities.
35. Banks controlled by the central government include the Central Bank of China, the Bank of
Communications, the Central Trust of China, the Farmers Bank of China, and the Export-Import
Bank of the Republic of China. The commercial banks controlled by the Taiwan provincial govern-
ment include the Chang Hwa Commercial Bank, the Hua Nan Commercial Bank, and the First
Commercial Bank. The provincial government also controls the Land Bank of Taiwan, the Bank of
Taiwan, the Medium Business Bank of Taiwan, and Cooperative Bank of Taiwan. PEAT, MARWICK,
supra note 18, at 4. The International Commercial Bank of China is controlled by the KMT. Kaplan,
supra note 8, at 5.
36. They are the Overseas Chinese Commercial Banking Corporation, The Shanghai Commer-
cial & Savings Bank, Ltd., and the United World Chinese Commercial Bank. These banks are run
by overseas Chinese with close connections to the KMT. Friedland, Law for the Jungle: New
Legislation to Improve Banking Services, FAR E. ECON. REV., Jan. 25, 1990, at 52. In addition, there
are eight small and medium-sized enterprise banks. CENT. BANK OF CHINA, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
IN TAIWAN, THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA 13 (1984).
37. Mark & Owens, Taiwan's Market Losing Its Appeal for Foreign Bankers, supra note 22, at 1.
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In addition to the major commercial banks, Taiwan has various types of special
purpose banks. The Central Bank of China (CBC) acts as a bank to other
governmental units, regulates banks in cooperation with the Ministry of Finance
(MOF), and oversees exchange rate markets. Other special purpose banks in-
clude development banks, such as the Bank of Communications and the Export-
Import Bank of China; credit cooperatives; and credit departments in farmers'
and fishermen's associations. Additionally, eight small and medium-sized enter-
prise banks provide financial services within a limited geographical region.
38
Banks compete with bills finance houses to provide working capital to busi-
nesses through the organized money market. ROC authorities established three
bills finance houses in the 1970s in response to growing official perception that
the informal money market was large enough to threaten the stability of the
financial system generally. These bills finance houses assist in the issuance of
notes and bills by borrowers and help sustain an active secondary market for
them. 39 The ROC authorities exercise effective control over the bills finance
houses because their majority shareholders are government-owned banks.4 °
Banks compete with trust and investment companies in markets for long-term
savings and credit. The MOF licensed seven privately-owned trust companies
following adoption of a government policy in 1971 to promote the development
of these companies. 41 Trust companies are not supposed to accept deposits from
the public, but rather are to accept long-term trust funds. Trust companies were
originally licensed to help develop fiduciary services in Taiwan and expand
underdeveloped markets for long-term financial investments by promoting in-
vestment in securities and real estate for trusts and pensions.
The insurance industry in Taiwan has already made substantial progress to-
ward internationalization. The local insurance industry has long suffered from a
poor reputation with the public due to unsophisticated or unsound management
and investment policies. 42 In 1985, ROC authorities agreed to admit U.S. in-
38. CENT. BANK OF CHINA, supra note 36.
39. PEAT, MARWICK, supra note 18, at 6.
40. U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, NATIONAL TREATMENT STUDY 309 (1990).
41. The Ministry of Finance promulgated the "Rules Governing Trust and Investment Companies"
and "Criteria Governing Establishment of Trust and Investment Companies" on November 30, 1970.
Seven trust companies were licensed under these regulations. The China Development Company, estab-
lished in 1959, is also considered a trust company. CENT. BANK OF CHINA, supra note 36, at 17.
The Banking Law has contained provisions governing trust business since it was promulgated in 193 1.
Banking Law arts. 29-33 (as amended through Mar. 28, 1931). The concept of trust, however, is a
foreign concept not well recognized in ROC law. Until special regulations were issued in 1971, ROC
authorities were apparently unwilling to encourage the development of trust business among financial
institutions.
42. ROC officials licensed a large number of local insurance companies in 1960, but the track
record of many of the companies then licensed was unsatisfactory. No further licenses were granted
until U.S. companies put pressure on the ROC authorities in the 1980s. Local companies had a bad
reputation with the public for employing unprofessional, unreliable sales representatives and denying
valid claims. Local property and casualty insurance companies hold most of their assets in banks,
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surance companies into Taiwan, and soon thereafter admitted three property and
casualty companies. When further progress toward opening the domestic market
to foreign competition stalled, the United States pressured Taiwan with the threat
of trade sanctions. In 1989, Taiwan gave additional U.S. companies access to the
insurance market, bringing the total to three life and five property and casualty
* 43insurers.
Securities markets in Taiwan, just like other segments of the financial system,
have regulated and unregulated sectors. The Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC), under the supervision of the MOF, regulates the Taiwan Stock
Exchange (TSE). An informal market exists for margin credit, and occasionally
informal markets arise for particular products such as futures contracts,44
"under-the-counter" securities, 4 5 or options to buy shares in companies with
applications pending for new commercial bank licenses.
The securities market of Taiwan dates back to the 1950s when, as part of a
land reform program, former landowners were given government securities as
compensation for land transferred to tenant farmers. The TSE was founded in
1962 to assist private companies in raising capital. Through 1985, however, the
TSE had achieved only limited success in encouraging local companies to raise
capital through publicly issued securities. The public perceived the TSE as rife
with speculation and insider trading, and principals of closely held companies
were unwilling to dilute their control by allowing large blocks of stock to be held
by the public. In 1985, only 125 companies were listed on the TSE, and even
those companies listed often allowed only a small proportion of outstanding
shares to trade on the exchange.4 6
From 1986 to 1990, the TSE enjoyed unprecedented popularity among the
investing public as the index of stock values rose from 1,000 to over 12,000. The
Securities Exchange Act was revised to liberalize the requirements for granting
licenses to brokerages and to permit full service brokerage houses that acted as
dealers, brokers, and investment advisors. The number of brokerages increased
from 7 to 357 within a few years.47 Although the perception remained that
trading on the TSE was speculative and insider trading was rampant, this per-
ception now encouraged, rather than discouraged, large-scale public participa-
while local life insurance companies invest heavily in real estate. See Chu, More American Firms
Here Assure Challenge to Locals, and The ROC Insurance Industry: 'A 30-Year-Old Infant," in
FINANCIAL AND INVESTMENT YEARBOOK, ROC 1987, at 134-40 (1987).
43. Shen, Opening Wider to Foreign Competition, in FINANCIAL AND INVESTMENT YEARBOOK,
ROC 1990, at 94 (1990).
44. See McGregor, supra note 28.
45. This is an underground market for private placements of securities, and was quite lively prior to
the stock market crash. This contrasts with the official over-the-counter market, which had only two
listings. Wang, Under the Counter Securities Sales in Taiwan, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Oct. 1990, at 41.
46. Moore, Nobody Taps Taipei, FAR E. ECON. REV., Feb. 2, 1989, at 48.
47. Baum, Brokers' Blues; Shake-out Looms for Taiwan Securities Industry, FAR E. ECON. REV.,
Aug. 2, 1990, at 45. There are now more brokerage firms than listed companies in Taiwan.
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tion. A large number of people, such as housewives and taxi drivers, became
full-time speculators.48 Illegal margin lending provided by brokers with access to
the informal financial system increased the volume of speculation. The specu-
lative bubble in the TSE burst in early 1990. The market hit an all-time high of
12,495.37 on February 10, 1990, then declined to 2,560.47 on October 1, 1990.
By April 5, 1991, the TSE had recovered to 5,344.84.
Although government officials sought to discourage the rampant speculation
on the TSE, efforts either to slow down the rise or to break the fall were largely
ineffective. The speculative bubble was fueled by excess liquidity in the econ-
omy, which found its way to the TSE at least in part through informal margin
lending and underground investment houses. Until recently, only the KMT-
controlled Fu-Hwa Securities Finance Company was officially allowed to make
margin loans against stock as part of a policy to limit the quantity of, and
regulate the terms of, margin lending. This policy was frustrated, however,
because one service provided by brokerage firms included introductions to
sources of informal margin lending.4 9 The ready availability of informal margin
credit outside any effective government regulation combined with the stringent
standards for regulated margin credit from government-controlled sources is a
clear example of the paradoxical attitude toward financial regulation in Taiwan.
It also illustrates why the paradox persists. Not only was the Fu-Hwa able to
enjoy substantial profits from its monopoly license, but the appearance of strict
prudential regulation of margin lending could be maintained while the public
enjoyed ready access to informal sources of finance.5 °
The underground investment companies (UICs) rose to prominence in 1986
and 1987, creating major political, economic, and financial problems for ROC
authorities and investors. The UICs mushroomed to colossal proportions
5 1
within only a few years by offering returns to investors of 4 percent or more per
month. The initial government response was to do nothing about the UICs, since
they were little more than Ponzi or pyramid schemes. 2 By 1989, it was no
48. Stine, The Search for Ways to End Financial Anarchy, ASIAN FIN., July 15, 1990, at 29.
49. One local broker commented on the decision to abolish the monopoly on margin lending by
noting that "[illegal margin lending was so widespread, anyway, that it's hard to see how we stand
to make more profits by going legal and submitting to regulation." Kaye, Despite the Sobering
Experience, FAR E. ECON. REV., June 28, 1990, at 86.
50. A legal standard that is not widely observed also raises the possible issue of corruption
among government officials assigned to enforce the standard. See, e.g., H. DE SoTo, THE OTHER
PATH 191 (1989).
51. In less than five years, Hung Yuan, the largest UIC, together with some 170 smaller UICs,
were estimated to have taken the equivalent of U.S. $8 billion from more than a million investors in
Taiwan. McGregor, Fate of a Gray-Market Behemoth in Taiwan Could Cause Financial and Political
Tremors, Asian Wall St. J. Weekly, Nov. 20, 1989, at I.
52. The expression in Chinese for a pyramid scheme is lao shu hui or "rat club." A Ponzi
scheme is "[a] form of fraud in which belief in the success of a fictive enterprise is fostered by
payment of quick returns to first investors from money invested by others." 12 OxFoRD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY 101 (2d ed. 1989).
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longer possible to ignore them, but for political reasons neither was it possible to
take strong action against them. The most significant group of UICs investors
were also traditionally the staunchest supporters of the KMT regime. With an
important election in December 1989, government officials did not want to
appear responsible for bursting the bubble. Many investors were retired soldiers
whose standard of living had eroded as the value of their lump-sum retirement
compensation diminished with inflation. By investing the UICs, these investors
were able to participate in the surging stock and real estate markets and regain
a higher standard of living, although at the considerable risk of losing their
principal.53
Official response to UICs came in two stages. In 1989, the government revised
the banking law to prohibit UICs from taking additional funds from the public.
With no new infusions of funds, the UICs eventually collapsed, but not until
after the December 1989 elections. In 1990, the authorities began criminal pro-
ceedings against the leaders of some of the most notable UICs. 54 While the UICs
no longer present a threat to the stability of the ROC financial system, it would
be erroneous to infer from the demise of the UICs that the informal financial
system as a whole has been eliminated.
The informal financial system does not compete with commercial banks so
much as complement the services offered by banks and other regulated financial
institutions. According to an estimate by one Minister of Finance, 40 percent of
the capital requirements of private sector enterprise and 50 percent of the finan-
cial needs of families are met through the informal financial system,55 An econ-
omist recently estimated that from 1976 to 1987 informal sector credit accounted
for 30.18 percent to 41.01 percent of the credit required by private businesses.56
Recognizable components of the informal financial system include: traditional
savings and credit practices such as rotating credit clubs (hui or biao-hui);57
employee deposit taking by companies; underground money lenders (di xia quan
zhang) and pawn shops; discounting postdated checks (PDCs); informal margin
credit for stock purchases; and informal lending and borrowing between other-
wise regulated entities.58
53. McGregor, supra note 51.
54. Mark, Multibillion-Dollar Pyramid Scam Leads to Taiwan Executives' Arrest, Wall St. J.,
Aug. 24, 1990, at A4.
55. Speech by L.T. Hsu, Financial Reform in the R.O.C.-Employing a Financial System
Designed to Spur the Development of Science and Technology, at USA-ROC/ROC-USA Economic
Councils meeting in Phoenix, Ariz. (Nov. 27, 1953).
56. Friedland, supra note 36, at 53 (table of credit sources for private businesses compiled by
C.T. Hsu).
57. Loan clubs or rotating credit associations, known as hui in Chinese and Vietnamese, are also
used by Korean (kye), Japanese (tanomoshi), Mexican (tanda), and West Indian (susu) immigrants
in the U.S. to raise money outside regulated banking sources. Gorman, Do-It-Yourself Financing,
TIME, July 25, 1988, at 62.
58. Kaye, supra note 7, at 51.
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Based on a large scale survey, the ROC Ministry of Justice estimated in 1985
that 85 percent of the population had participated in rotating credit clubs, or huis,
and 91 percent thought huis were a popular form of finance. 59 Huis are usually
established on the basis of mutual trust of members or the reputation of the
founder of the club rather than on legal documentation. 60 Huis involve a group
of people pooling their savings by meeting at regular intervals when each group
member makes a fixed contribution. Each member of the group has a turn at
receiving the collected pool until all members have received it and the club
terminates or begins anew. The right to receive the collected pool of money may
be allocated by competitive bidding so that the member willing to pay the highest
interest rate receives the pool earlier than other members.
Employee deposit taking was originally encouraged by ROC authorities when
credit conditions in Taiwan were highly restrictive. The MOF gave companies
incentives to borrow from employees by granting favorable tax treatment to the
interest expense incurred on such borrowing. 61 Although the tax incentive no
longer exists, the practice of commercial companies taking savings from the
public has proven difficult to stamp out. 62 From the point of view of the em-
ployer, encouraging employees to save through investing in the company gives
the employees an incentive to support the company, and also relieves the pres-
sure to seek financing from outside sources. 63 Higher interest rates have usually
been the incentive offered to lure employees away from the regulated financial
system. 64
Underground money lenders are private individuals or gangsters who lend for
very short periods at high interest rates. 65 The CBC monitors conditions in this
59. ROC MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, TAI WAN Di Qu MIN JIAN HE Hui XIAN KUANG ZHI YEN JIU
[RESEARCH ON THE CURRENT CONDITION OF ROTATING CREDIT CLUBS IN TAIWAN] 25, 129 (1985) (in
Chinese).
60. Id. at 41.
61. Interview with Professor J. D. Shea, Academia Sinica (June 16, 1990).
62. The 1989 revision of the Banking Law tightened up the prohibition on deposit taking by
nonbanks. See infra text section III.C.
63. Although the structure of the arrangements are very different, in this regard employee
deposit taking in Taiwan serves a similar purpose to employee stock ownership plans or granting
stock options to management in the United States.
64. Although the 1989 revision of the ROC Banking Law, discussed infra at text section III.C.,
attempts to prohibit deposit taking by nonbanks, the Central Bank of China Economic Research
Department still publishes a figure for the average interest rates on "deposits with firms." For
example, for April 1990, the average interest rate for deposits with firms in Taipei City was 1.51
percent a month, with a high of 2.30 percent and a low of 0.90 percent. This compares with a 9.25
percent annual interest rate on a one-year time deposit with the Bank of Taiwan. ECON. RESEARCH
DEP'T, CBC, FINANCIAL STATISTICS MONTHLY, TAIWAN DISTRICT, THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA, MAY
1990, at 110, 119 [hereinafter CBC Monthly Financial Statistics May 1990].
65. Many of these money lenders used to provide foreign exchange services when a rigid system
of foreign exchange control was in place. Goldstein, In Exchange for What?, FAR E. ECON. REV.,
Oct. 3, 1985, at 67. See also C.J. SHEU, TAI BEI SHi BANG PAl FAN ZUI TUAN TI ZHI SHI ZHENG YEN
JuI [RESEARCH ON ORGANIZED CRIME IN TAIPEI] 32 (1990) (in Chinese).
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part of the informal financial system and publishes an estimate of the prevailing
interest rate together with the rest of the financial statistics for Taiwan.66
Many businesses raise capital from other businesses rather than through banks
or the stock market. By borrowing from suppliers or customers, businesses can
cement existing relationships by offering above-market interest rates.67 The
problem this and other forms of informal finance raises for regulated lenders such
as banks is that these investments are often not reflected in company records.
68
This failure to record accurately large amounts of informal credit is a function
both of the depth of the informal financial market and the low accounting stan-
dards applied in the preparation of financial statements.
69
Local businesses historically have not implemented sophisticated bookkeeping
systems for a variety of reasons, including tax evasion. 70 The Income Tax Law
indirectly sanctions the practice of not maintaining adequate accounting records
by providing that the tax collecting authority may use industry standards for
profitability to estimate the income of a business that cannot produce evidence to
prove its actual income. 7 1 In practice, permitting tax authorities to estimate the
profitability of a firm will often produce an effective tax rate lower than that
based on actual revenues. 72 The reluctance of local businesses to establish and
maintain reliable financial records has diminished, however, since the benefits of
being a publicly listed company became apparent during the stock market boom
of 1987-89. 73
66. For April 1990 in Taipei, average monthly interest rates for the following types of loans were
as follows: (a) loans against PDC- 1.88 percent; (b) unsecured loans-1.96 percent; and (c) de-
posits with firms- 1.51 percent. This compares with 9.25 percent a year for one-year deposits with
the Bank of Taiwan. CBC Monthly Financial Statistics May 1990, supra note 64, at 110, 119.
67. Friedland & Kaye, Pennies from Heaven: Kerb Financiers Promote Cult of Money, FAR E.
EcON. REV., Jan. 25, 1990, at 54.
68. Goldstein, A Series of Shocks Rocks an Archaic System, FAR E. EcoN. REV., Apr. 25, 1985,
at 74.
69. S. Champion, American Bankers' Comments on Accounting and Auditing Standards in
Taiwan (undated); R.S.C. Chen, An Evaluation of Some Aspects of the Public Accounting Profes-
sion in Taiwan (1973) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Mo.-Columbia). See also infra text
section IV.B.
70. Winn, Creditors' Rights in Taiwan: A Comparison of Corporate Reorganization Law in the
United States and the Republic of China, 13 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 409, 420 (1988).
71. Income Tax Law art. 83(1) (as amended through Dec. 30, 1987) provides [translation by Lee
& Li, Attorneys at Law]:
A taxpayer shall, during the conduct of an investigation or reinvestigation by the collection authority, produce
account books and related documents of evidence that will prove the amount of his income. Where such account
books and documents of evidence are not produced, the collection authority may determine the amount of his
income on the basis of available taxation data or the profit standard of the trade concerned.
In 1986, the MOF published average profitability figures for nine major categories and approximately
750 subcategories of trade and industry.
72. Winn, supra note 70.
73. Li, Accounting: A Growth Profession in Search of More Talent, Better Oversight, in FINAN-
CIAL AND INVES'TME rT YEARBOOK, ROC 1990, at 138 (1990); interview with John G. Sim, partner,
KPMG Peat, Marwick, Taipei (July 5, 1990). According to Mr. Sim, the standard that the SEC is
understood to apply in reviewing an application of an existing company to list on the TSE is three
years of financial statements audited by one of the large, usually internationally-affiliated, CPA firms.
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The magnitude of unreported informal borrowing by companies, and the threat
to the stability of the financial system posed by such illicit borrowing, became
apparent following the Cathay Scandal in 1985.74 The Cathay Scandal erupted in
February 1985 when the Cathay Plastics Company and the Tenth Credit Coop-
erative both collapsed after receiving huge sums from investors. Cathay Plastics
was controlled by Tsai Chen-chou, a prominent member of the Legislative Yuan
or parliament. 75 Cathay Plastics had absorbed 5 billion New Taiwan dollars
(NT$) 76 from the public in exchange for PDCs. Cathay Plastics had also im-
properly borrowed NT$7.7 billion from Tenth Credit by using the names of
employees and then diverting the money to corporate uses, a violation of the
requirement that credit cooperatives only lend to individuals. 77 Foreign bank
creditors faced a problem of similar magnitude in the court-ordered reorganiza-
tion of the Ta Nun Company when private investors were allowed to present huge
claims that were not reflected in the company accounts.
78
C. REGULATION OF BANKS
1. Domestic Commercial Banks
In theory, commercial banks in Taiwan have the power to play a significant
role in shaping economic development. In reality, due to substantial direct gov-
ernment interference with management decisions, commercial banks have been
allowed to exercise little autonomy, although there are many signs that this
finally may be changing. The ROC banking system historically has been seen as
an instrument for promoting economic and political policies; as a result, imple-
mentation of these government policies had the indirect effect of repressing the
This creates an incentive for companies considering listing to adopt standard accounting procedures
and submit to regular audits, but would have no effect on small and medium businesses that are not
considering listing on the TSE.
74. Winn, supra note 70, at 420, 463.
75. Following the Cathay Scandal, Tsai was convicted of bouncing 5,565 checks for the equiv-
alent of U.S. $47 million. Shao, Taiwan Notes, Asian Wall St. J., Feb. 3, 1986, at 1.
76. In 1985, when the Cathay Scandal occurred, the exchange rate between the NT$ and the U.S.
$ was 40:1. The exchange rate in April 1990 when this article was written was approximately 27.5:1.
77. Goldstein, Discredited Policies, FAR E. ECON. REV., Apr. 11, 1985, at 70. In early February,
the Cooperative Bank of Taiwan (Co-op Bank), which is charged with overseeing credit cooperatives,
stepped in with an emergency loan of NT$3 billion to bail out Tenth Credit. This proved inadequate,
and in mid-February, the Co-op Bank extended another NT$6 billion credit to Tenth Credit. China
Economic News, Feb. 18, 1985, at 1. An informed local observer speculated off the record in an
interview in 1986 that the first tranche of the bailout appeared to have been used to pay off well-
placed investors in Tsal's business empire, leaving small investors to take their losses. If true, this
information gives further confirmation that large amounts of credit are not reported officially, and
also indicates why they might not be reported. This speculation is confirmed by Goldstein, "Most
of the [Co-op Bank bailout] money has disappeared, leaving only unsubstantiated, yet widespread
rumours that high government and party leaders were paid off by Tsai." The Never-Ending Story, FAR
E. EcON. REV., Sept. 12, 1985, at 94.
78. Winn, supra note 70.
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development of the financial system. 79 The operation of financial markets has
been distorted by interest rate controls, the regulation of lending practices, and
credit allocation policies. 80 The licensing of new, privately-owned commercial
banks in April 1991 should overcome the problem of credit allocation according
to politically established priorities. Personnel of government-owned commercial
banks cannot expect to exercise independent judgment in lending and manage-
ment decisions, however, until those banks are privatized.81
The ROC Banking Law, promulgated on March 28, 1931, and as amended
through July 17, 1989 (Banking Law), is the primary source of law applied to
regulated commercial banks in Taiwan. The Banking Law governs the formalities
of incorporation, application for licensing, modification or dissolution of a
bank's corporate structure, the standards of conduct for bank officers, and reg-
ulatory responses to bank failures. Until the most recent amendments, it also
regulated the terms on which credit could be provided by banks.
With the 1989 revision of the Banking Law, ROC authorities have finally
officially relinquished control over interest rates.8 2 Preferential interest rates as
high as 7 percent a month were used with success in the 1950s to curb inflation,
but established a precedent of government control over bank interest rates. The
deregulation of interest rates was a gradual process, beginning in the 1970s with
the establishment of a money market to indicate market-clearing interest rates. In
November 1980, the CBC issued regulations authorizing banks to set selected
interest rates while expanding the range between maximum and minimum reg-
ulated interest rates. In 1985, banks were required to announce a prime lending
rate between the maximum and minimum rates set by the CBC, and were au-
thorized to set their own foreign currency deposit rates. In 1989, the authority of
the CBC to set interest rates was deleted from article 41 of the Banking Law and
maximum and minimum rates were abolished. It now remains to be seen whether
abolition of all formal interest rate controls will be enough to allow market forces
to determine interest rates in Taiwan.
Earlier versions of the Banking Law contained substantial restrictions on the
type of loans a bank could extend. Although these restrictions have been relaxed
with each revision and are now no longer included in the Banking Law, they have
continued to influence the lending policies of regulated banks for many years
after their abolition, contributing to the "pawnshop" approach of these banks.
83
For example, until the 1968 revision a bank could not extend unsecured credit
for a term greater than six months or credit secured by pledge or mortgage of real
79. OECD, supra note 23.
80. Id.
81. Baum, Banking on Big Business, FAR E. ECON. REV., Apr. 4, 1991, at 36.
82. Shea, supra note 32, at 48, 56.
83. Ralph, Impediments to Modern Banking in Taiwan, INDUS. OF FREE CHINA, Sept. 1970, at 14.
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estate for a term greater than one year. 84 In 1968, the limitation on unsecured and
secured credit was relaxed to permit terms of one and three years, respectively.
Additionally, a five-year term was permitted for loans for which the borrower
paid off the principal in installments over the term of the loan.85 In 1975, this
requirement was replaced with the condition that the volume of medium-term
credit not exceed the amount of time deposits a bank holds; this condition
remains in effect.8 6 Until 1975, regulated banks could extend credit for no more
than 70 percent of the appraised value of the collateral.87
Responding to these statutory requirements, local bankers focused primarily
on collateral rather than on any financial measure of profitability. Bankers struc-
tured loans to appear short-term, but both lender and borrower understood that
the loans would be rolled over as long as the collateral was in place. This form
of credit was known as "evergreen" financing because it focused on the con-
tinued existence of the collateral rather than the conduct of the business. As long
as the collateral remained in existence, the credit was available. The focus on
short-term, secured lending gave rise to the "pawnshop" mentality charge lev-
eled at lending officers in government-owned banks. Due to the lack of reliable
financial statements from borrowers, however, bankers resisted any movement
toward financial analyses of creditworthiness.
88
Bankers at government-owned banks have also been constrained not only by
regulations concerning the terms of credit but by credit allocation priorities set by
the form of "indicative" or noncompulsory economic planning practiced by the
ROC government. First, the ROC has given priority for scarce credit to govern-
ment-owned enterprises; private enterprises that cooperated with government
economic plans received the next priority.89 By the time applications from po-
84. Banking Law art. 54 (as amended through June 16, 1950).
85. Id. art. 54 (as amended through Nov. 11, 1968).
86. Id. art. 72.
87. Id. art. 37 (as amended through Nov. 11, 1968). In the 1975 revisions, the requirement was
only that the bank obtain an appraisal and that the CBC had the authority to regulate the terms of
secured credit. Id. (as amended through July 4, 1975).
88. U.S. and other foreign bankers entered Taiwan in large numbers in the late 1970s and early
1980s. Finding that most large corporate borrowers already had well-established relationships with
local banks, foreign banks rushed into the "middle market" of small and medium-sized businesses.
In the recession that began in 1982, foreign bankers learned that the financial statements upon which
they had relied in extending the credit were too often largely fictional.
The failure of local lending officers to look beyond collateral in making credit decisions gave rise
to an opportunity of sorts for local businesses. If a business could raise start-up money in the
informal financial system and acquire title to tangible assets, then those assets might be mortgaged
to banks at low rates of interest. The loan proceeds from the regulated lenders could be used to repay
loans from the informal sector and cash out the principal's interest in the business, assuming the
appraised value of the asset was high enough. This effectively left the regulated lender as the equity
interest in the business, but in exchange for a fixed, below-market interest rate and without any
compensation for the risk associated with equity investments.
89. T. GOLD, supra note 2, at 108-09.
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tential borrowers with no connection to government plans were considered, these
applications generally exceeded the amount of credit available.
90
The most severe restrictions on the development of government-owned com-
mercial banks has come from the Control Yuan. The Control Yuan, one of five
branches of the ROC government, performs an audit function similar to that of
the General Accounting Office of the United States Congress, combined with the
power of enforcement. The audit function can be exercised at the request of
private citizens or on the Control Yuan's own initiative. 9 1 As part of this inves-
tigative function the Control Yuan has the power to impeach or censure public
officials.92 The Control Yuan's jurisdiction over commercial banks is based on
the government ownership of these banks. This renders commercial bank assets
a form of government property and turns employees of government-owned banks
into civil service employees. While the banking regulations of the CBC and
MOF are largely based on modem financial concepts, Control Yuan banking
regulations appear archaic and draconian by comparison. For example, according
to conventional notions of corporate finance, a shareholder owns an undivided
partial interest in the corporation as a whole but does not own any individual
asset of the corporation. Title to a particular asset (such as a loan in the case of
a financial institution) is held instead by the corporation, a distinct legal entity.
The Control Yuan, by contrast, believes that not just the government-held shares
but each loan made by a government-owned bank is public property. Every
default on a loan from a government-owned bank is a loss of public property that
may warrant a Control Yuan investigation and prosecution. While in practice a
bank officer responsible for an uncollectible loan may face demotion or repri-
mand, in theory, responsibility could extend to unlimited personal liability for the
amount of the loan and criminal penalties.93
One consequence of the emphasis on collateral in lending and justifiable fear
of Control Yuan oversight has been the failure of lending officers at government-
owned banks to adopt modern lending practices. Fortunately, the focus on the
value of collateral in lending is no longer mandated by statute, and the oversight
of the Control Yuan will end with the privatization of the commercial banks. The
shortage of bank and regulatory personnel trained in modem lending practices
and principles of financial analysis cannot quickly be remedied, however, and
will pose a serious obstacle to the rapid liberalization of commercial banking in
Taiwan.
90. As one bank manager commented off the record, a bank officer confronted with a large
number of applications that all meet official standards is well placed to receive bribes.
91. ROC CONST. art. 90; REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1986: A REFERENCE BOOK 140 (D.D.S. Sung &
L.C. Ho eds. 1986) (referring to provisions of the Control Law). Members of the Control Yuan are
elected. ROC CONST. art. 91.
92. ROC CONST. art. 97.
93. Liang, Financial Reforms Recommended by the Economic Reform Committee, Republic of
China, INDUSTRY OF FREE CHINA, Mar. 1986, at 9.
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Whether ROC officials succeed in liberalizing Taiwan's banking system will
depend on whether the authorities are able to monitor and regulate bank activities
effectively. The largely unsuccessful experiment with trust companies offers
insight into what might go wrong if the newly licensed and privately owned
commercial banks are not adequately supervised. 94 Inadequate official supervi-
sion combined with unsound management practices at many trust companies led
first to a rapid expansion in the late 1970s and early 1980s followed by several
spectacular failures. Instead of developing the market for long-term investments
(as regulators had hoped), trust companies in the late 1970s and early 1980s
expanded rapidly by competing with commercial banks. Several trust companies
ran into severe problems in the mid-1980s as local real estate and stock markets
collapsed, drying up speculative profits. Some trust companies, such as Asia
Trust and Cathay Trust, overextended credits to affiliated companies. Among the
seven trust companies licensed in the early 1970s, three have experienced major
liquidity crises and have been rescued through official intervention.
95
2. Foreign Commercial Bank Branches Operating in Taiwan
Foreign banks have done business in Taiwan for over thirty years, and yet the
position of foreign banks remains marginal in many respects. Internationaliza-
tion of the ROC financial system will only be achieved if foreign banks are
allowed greater access to local markets and are authorized to engage in a
broader spectrum of activities. Despite official proclamations that the ROC
banking system is internationalizing, changes in the status of foreign banks have
come slowly.
96
Foreign banks have operated in Taiwan since Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank of Japan
opened a branch in 1959. Until the late 1970s, however, official policy placed
strict limitations on foreign bank presence in the country. During the 1970s,
conditions changed in both Taiwan and the international banking community, and
a dramatic influx of foreign banks into Taiwan began. In 1971, the People's
Republic of China (PRC) took the ROC's place at the United Nations, and in
1979 the United States shifted its diplomatic recognition away from the ROC in
favor of the PRC. These diplomatic developments seem to have contributed to a
94. K. Field, supra note 17, at 169.
95. In 1982, Asia Trust encountered serious liquidity problems and management was turned over
to the International Commercial Bank of China. Asia Trust was the finance arm of the Asiaworld
group of companies. In 1985, the Cathay Trust experienced a run and was taken over by a group of
banks in an informal rescue. Later in 1985, the Overseas Trust was taken over by the United World
Chinese Commercial Bank after a run on deposits sparked in part by the collapse of Cathay Trust.
Overseas Trust officials were later found to have misappropriated funds and were prosecuted. Huang,
Taiwan's Trust & Investment Companies: Can They Survive?, in FINANCIAL AND INVESTMENT YEAR-
BOOK, ROC 1986, at 102 (1986).
96. ROC Commits Itself to Financial Internationalization, Cent. News Agency, Jan. 16, 1991;
Owens, Officials' Dreams of Creating Financial Center Slowed by Regulatory Barriers, Taipei
Stigma, Asian Wall St. J. Weekly, July 15, 1991, at 10.
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reconsideration of the KMT regime's on foreign bank presence just when inter-
national banks were flush with recycled petrodollars following the second major
OPEC oil price increase. Taiwan had also experienced almost two decades of
continuous rapid economic growth, and by admitting foreign banks to perform a
limited range of services, ROC officials hoped to upgrade the quality of banking
services offered while still sheltering domestic banks from the full force of
foreign competition. In June 1979, thirteen foreign banks had branches in
Taipei. 97 As of September 1990, a total of fifty-five foreign banks were doing
business in Taiwan either through branch or representative offices.
9 8
Although the number of foreign banks operating in Taiwan has increased
dramatically over the last decade, their significance to the financial system as a
whole has not increased commensurately. According to one economist's esti-
mate, the presence of foreign banks measured by the number of offices they
maintain as a percentage of all offices maintained by banks or similar financial
institutions is only about 1 percent. 99 Further, estimated assets held by foreign
banks as a percentage of all financial assets, including the postal savings system
and insurance companies, measured just under 3 percent in 1989.10o According
to MOF estimates, foreign banks control 1 percent of NT$ deposits and less than
5 percent of the domestic loan market.' 0 1
The ROC authorities have only recently begun to relax the severe constraints
on foreign bank operations in Taiwan. In 1986, according to the Office of the
U.S. Trade Representative, foreign banks suffered the following disadvantages
in Taiwan: a prohibition on equity investments in local banks; a prohibition on
the establishment of wholly owned subsidiaries (although limited investments in
leasing companies and trust and investment companies were allowed); and severe
restrictions on branching and the scope of business activities. 102
In 1986, foreign banks could establish only two branches: one in Taipei and
one in Kaohsiung. A minimum working capital of U.S. $2 million was required
to set up a branch, and the volume of loans was limited to 12.5 times the amount
97. I.S. Sun, Possible Future Developments Affecting Foreign Banks Dealing with Taiwan I
(June 5, 1979) (paper presented at ROC/US-US/ROC Joint Economic Council Meeting).
98. Mark & Owens, supra note 22, at 1.
99. In 1961, foreign banks represented 0.07 percent of all units; in 1970, 0.38 percent; in 1980,
0.74 percent; and in 1989, 0.99 percent. Shea, supra note 32, table 1.
100. In 1961, it was 0.88 percent; in 1970, 2.95 percent; in 1980, 5.49 percent; and in 1989, 2.98
percent. Id. The increase in 1980 and the subsequent decline no doubt reflects the trend of foreign
banks to move toward fee generating activities and away from lending after many foreign banks
sustained heavy losses on lending in the early and mid-1980s.
101. Mark & Owens, supra note 22.
102. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE: 1986 REPORT ON
FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 247-48 (1986); [hereinafter USTR 1986 REPORT]. The report also lists
the following further disadvantages: high minimum capital requirements and restrictive screening
criteria for admission; restricted access to CBC rediscount facilities; a prohibition on offshore
foreign exchange settlements; and exclusion from the Foreign Exchange Center, which helps set
exchange rates.
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of paid-in capital.' 0 3 Because the Banking Law provided that a foreign bank
branch in Taiwan should be considered a type of commercial bank, foreign banks
could not accept long-term deposits, that privilege being reserved to savings
banks. ' 0 4 Other regulations provided that foreign banks could not take deposits
with a term of more than six months, but had to rely on short-term funding
sources. 10 5 Foreign banks were also prohibited from providing financial services
to individuals. 10 6 Further, foreign banks had only limited access to rediscount
facilities at the CBC 10 7 and were denied access to redeposited funds from the
Postal Savings System. ' 0 8 In addition, foreign banks were subject to limitations
on local currency lending, commercial paper guarantees, and construction
project lending.10 9 Foreign banks were also restricted in their participation in
foreign exchange markets.11
0
II. Pressures for, and Resistance to, Internationalization
A. U.S. POLICIES AIMED AT REDUCING THE
ROC's TRADE SURPLUS WITH THE UNITED STATES
Taiwan's economic miracle is due not only to the hard work of the people of
Taiwan and the economic policies of the ROC government, but also to the
concerted support and encouragement the United States has given the ROC since
1950. "' By the 1980s, Taiwan had been transformed from a rural outpost of the
Chinese and Japanese empires to an exporting powerhouse, due in part to sub-
stantial assistance from the United States in the form of concessionary customs
duties on Taiwan's exports. 112 Within the last decade, U.S. policy toward Tai-
103. Criteria for the Establishment of a Foreign Bank Branch or Representative Office, 1983
Foreign Bank Criteria art. 13 (promulgated by the MOF on August 23, 1983) [hereinafter 1983
Foreign Bank Criteria].
104. Banking Law art. 121 and art. 71 (as amended through May 20, 1985).
105. 1983 Foreign Bank Criteria, supra note 103, art. 11.
106. Id. art. 14.
107. USTR 1986 REPORT, supra note 102, at 247.
108. The Postal Savings System was established in 1930 and offers savings and payment services
to the public through offices of the Post Office. The savings it receives from the public are redeposited
with banks, and historically have been directed to banks whose lending was premised on the fulfill-
ment of specific economic policies. Such banks include the Bank of Communications, the Farmers
Bank of China, the Land Bank of Taiwan, and the Medium and Small Business Banks. CENT. BANK
OF CHINA, supra note 36, at 8.
109. Kaplan, supra note 8, at 10.
110. Id. at 14.
111. Cumings, The Origins and Development of the Northeast Asian Political Economy: Indus-
trial Sectors, Product Cycles and Consequences, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE NEW ASIAN
INDUSTRIALISM 65 (F.C. Deyo ed. 1987).
112. Despite its outstanding economic performance, Taiwan continued to enjoy the benefits of the
U.S. Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) (see 19 U.S.C. §§ 2462-2466 (1988)) program
designed to facilitate exports from developing countries to the U.S. market. In 1986, Taiwan was the
largest single recipient of GSP benefits. Not until January 2, 1989, did the U.S. exclude Taiwan from
the system. MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TRANSMITTING NOTIFICATION OF His
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wan has gradually undergone a substantial transformation as Taiwan first grad-
uated from the status of a mere developing country to that of a "newly indus-
trialized country," and then moved on to achieve virtually the largest foreign
exchange reserves in the world, accompanied by a massive, continuing trade
surplus with the United States.113
There have been several official U.S. responses to Taiwan's growing economic
strength and the continuing trade imbalance between the two countries: termi-
nation of Taiwan's eligibility for benefits under the Generalized System of Pref-
erences program; a1 4 threats of retaliatory trade sanctions for foreign countries
that fail to grant reciprocal treatment in trade matters; requests for national
treatment for U.S. entities operating in Taiwan; and criticism of exchange rate
manipulations that artificially preserve the Taiwan balance of payments surplus.
With regard to opening markets in Taiwan to U.S. financial services, the policies
have met with significant, but not unqualified, success.
1. Trade Act and Reciprocity
In response to the perception that U.S. exporters were denied equal access to
the domestic markets of countries exporting to the United States, Congress
passed section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.115 The statutory provisions gov-
erning section 301 trade sanctions were amended and strengthened in 1979,
1984, and 1988.116 Section 301 grants the President authority to promote equal
access for U.S. exporters by taking appropriate action to eliminate unreasonable
trade practices by foreign nations exporting to the United States." 7 If the Pres-
ident, acting through the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), determines that a
trade restriction of a foreign country is "unjustifiable, unreasonable, or discrim-
inatory and burdens or restricts U.S. commerce,"' 18 then the USTR may sus-
pend or prevent the application of, or may refrain from proclaiming, benefits of
trade agreement concessions, or may impose duties or other import restrictions
INTENT TO REMOVE. .. TAIWAN . .. FROM THE LIST OF BENEFICIARY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES UNDER
THE GSP, H.R. Doc. No. 162, 100th Cong. 2d Sess. (1988).
113. In January 1991, Taiwan's foreign exchange reserves were U.S. $73 billion. Holloway,
Taiwan Too Reserved, FAR E. ECON. REV., Jan. 31, 1991, at 48. In 1990, per capita income in Taiwan
was equal to U.S. $7,990, which ranked Taiwan 25th in the world in terms of per capita income
levels. Baum, Rich in Six Years, FAR E. EON. REV., Feb. 14, 1991, at 48.
114. See supra note 112.
115. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, sec. 301, 88 Stat. 1978, 2041-43 (codified as
amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1988)).
116. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, sec. 301, 93 Stat. 144, 236 (codified as
amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2511 (1988)); Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, sec. 304,
98 Stat. 3002-06 (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-2416 (1988)); and Omnibus Trade and Compet-
itiveness Act of 1988, sec. 1301, 102 Stat. 1164 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1988)).
117. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, sec. 301(a), 88 Stat. 1978, 2041-43 (codified as
amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(1988)).
118. Id. sec. 301(a)(2)(B), 88 Stat. 1978, 2041-43 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C.
§ 241 l(a)(2)(B) (1988)).
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on goods.' 19 The 1988 amendments created "Super 301" sanctions: the USTR
can identify "priority" countries that have established "systemic" barriers to
U.S. exports, and can authorize retaliatory action in response to "priority"
foreign trade problems.' 
20
Since statutory provisions governing section 301 trade sanctions were
strengthened in 1984,121 Taiwan has been the subject of repeated investigations
by the USTR and has participated in many negotiations to avoid the imposition
of trade sanctions.' 22 In 1986, Taiwan was investigated for its customs valuation
system, 123 its state alcohol and tobacco monopoly distribution system, 124 and
export performance requirements.' 25 Although not among the three countries
named for consideration under Super 301 provisions in 1989, Taiwan was among
the nations considered for such treatment. 1
26
The opening of the insurance industry of Taiwan to greater participation by
U.S. companies has been an issue considered by the USTR. In 1990, the USTR
found that Taiwan still had significant barriers to entry into its insurance mar-
kets. 127 ROC authorities have allowed a maximum of two life and two nonlife
U.S. insurance companies to establish operations in Taiwan each year, and
companies already in Taiwan face restrictions regarding investment in real estate
and branching. The ROC does not permit U.S. mutual insurance companies to do
business in Taiwan because they are not authorized under the ROC Insurance
Law. For some time the ROC authorities have been considering amending the
Insurance Law to permit mutual companies to enter Taiwan, but have not yet
acted in this regard. 128
119. Id. sec. 301(b)(1)-(2) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2411(b)(l)-(2) (1988)). Private parties can
also petition to initiate an investigation, and until 1985, all investigations were undertaken at the
instigation of private parties. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411 (c)(1)-(2), 2412. See Note, Defining Unreasonable-
ness in Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act, 96 YALE L.J. 1122 n. 11.
120. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, title I, sec. 1302(a),
102 Stat. 1176 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2420 (1988)).
121. Prior to 1984, Taiwan was the subject of numerous complaints for unfair trade practices.
These included complaints about tariffs on major appliances (1979); nonrubber footwear (1982); rice
export subsidies (1983); and films (1983). Oversight of the Trade Act of 1988: Hearing Before the
Senate Comm. on Finance, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 69 (1989) [hereinafter Trade Act Hearing].
122. Taiwan Plans Appeal Against U.S. Trade Blacklist, Reuters Apr. 18, 1990; see also Kaye,
Taipei Says "No," FAR E. ECON. REV., Apr. 19, 1990, at 82.
123. Trade Act Hearing, supra note 121, at 63.
124. Id. at 64.
125. Id. at 69.
126. Moore, Pressure Point, FAR E. EcON. REV., Mar. 2, 1989, at 92.
127. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 1990 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE
BARRIERS 189-90 (1990) [hereinafter USTR 1990 REPORT].
128. The Executive Yuan (cabinet) passed a draft revision of the Insurance Law and sent it to the
Legislative Yuan (legislature) on April 26, 1990. In addition, in trade negotiations with the United
States in May 1990, ROC authorities agreed to loosen somewhat the regulatory standards for
admission of U.S insurance companies to Taiwan, and raised the quota for the number of companies
that could be admitted each year. The issue of mutual companies had not yet been resolved,
however. Huang and Chen, Draft Revision of the ROC Insurance Law Passed, 2 ASIA L. & PRAC.
27(1990).
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2. International Banking Act and National Treatment
Although discrimination against U.S. banks operating in Taiwan has period-
ically been considered in conjunction with other trade barrier issues, the demand
of U.S. banks for equal access to the domestic markets of foreign banks oper-
ating in the United States is often dealt with separately.' 2 9 The standard of
"national treatment" for U.S. banks overseas was adopted with the enactment of
the International Banking Act of 1978, as amended (IBA). 130 The national treat-
ment standard applied to U.S. bank operations overseas is aimed at securing
equality of competitive opportunity between foreign and domestic institutions in
similar circumstances, rather than the precise balancing of specific regulations
implied in a reciprocity standard. 131 The concept of "national treatment" does
not, however, include a threat of retaliation like that found in the section 301 and
Super 301 provisions of the Trade Act. 132 The IBA and the Financial Reports Act
of 1988133 require instead that the Secretary of the Treasury periodically report
on the treatment of U.S. banks in foreign markets, and that the President or his
designee conduct discussions with the governments of countries that are major
financial centers. The Reagan and Bush Administrations have resisted the use of
a reciprocity standard in international financial markets because even limited
reciprocity has been seen as bringing a risk of retaliation. The impact of possible
retaliation "could be devastating to confidence in world financial markets and
established patterns of monetary and capital flows.',
134
This bifurcated procedure for seeking to eliminate barriers to most U.S. ex-
ports under legislation aimed at reciprocity, combined with a threat of retaliation
on the one hand and seeking to eliminate barriers to U.S. financial services under
a national treatment standard on the other, seems to place U.S. efforts to en-
courage the ROC to open its domestic banking market on the level of moral
suasion. 135 There have been repeated unsuccessful attempts in Congress in recent
129. See, e.g., USTR 1990 REPORT, supra note 127, at 209, where financial market issues are in
an appendix at the end of the report and the coverage is based on information filed by interested
parties, not on the research of the U.S. Trade Representative. Equal competitive access for U.S.
banks overseas were dealt with instead in U.S. DEP'T OF THfE TREASURY, 1990 NATIONAL TREATMENT
STUDY-REPORT ON FOREIGN TREATMENT OF U.S. FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (1990) [hereinafter 1990
NATIONAL TREATMENT STUDY].
130. 12 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3108 (1988). The requirement that the Secretary of the Treasury study
discrimination against U.S. banks in foreign markets is codified in a note to 12 U.S.C. § 601 (1988).
Pub. L. No. 95-369, sec. 9(a), 92 Stat. 623 (1978).
131. U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, 1986 NATIONAL TREATMENT STUDY 1, 17.
132. ld.; see also Orr, Reciprocity and Regulation of Entry, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 333, 334.
133. Financial Reports Act of 1988, §§ 3602-3603, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1387
(codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 5352-5353 (1988)).
134. 1990 NATIONAL TREATMENT STUDY, supra note 129, at 202. The European Community
threatened to adopt a reciprocity standard when the Single Market legislation goes into effect on
January i, 1993, but after strong U.S. opposition, a national treatment standard was adopted in the
Second Banking Directive. Id. at 203.
135. While this may seem paradoxical with regard to the position of U.S. banks in Taiwan, the
bifurcation clearly favors the United States in the context of negotiations with the European Com-
munity, as mentioned supra note 134.
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years to modify the standards of the IBA to permit more forceful action by the
United States in response to Taiwan's failure to grant national treatment to U.S.
banks. 136
3. Exchange Rate Manipulation
The United States has focused its attention not only on increasing exports of
U.S. services to Taiwan, but also of accelerating the liberalization of ROC
foreign exchange regulations. Although Taiwan's continuing trade surplus and
immense foreign exchange reserves are due in part to its successful export-
oriented economic programs, an undervalued exchange rate has allowed these
conditions to persist longer than would otherwise have been possible.' 37 In 1988,
as part of the amendments to the Trade Act, Congress mandated that the ad-
ministration take steps to stop manipulation of foreign exchange rates that con-
tributes to the U.S. trade deficit. 138 Under the Exchange Rates and International
Economic Policy Coordination Act of 1988, the President is authorized to enter
into negotiations with other countries found to be manipulating their currencies
and having a significant trade surplus with the United States. 139 The Secretary of
the Treasury is also required to publish a report on exchange rate policies of
trading partners every six months.14o Taiwan's foreign exchange rate policy has
figured prominently in every report prepared by the Treasury since 1988. 141
Prior to 1987, the CBC exercised substantial control over the market for
foreign exchange in Taiwan. 142 Under the Statute for Administration of Foreign
Exchange (SAFE), private parties were not allowed to hold foreign currencies
136. As this article is being written, the Fair Trade in Financial Services Act of 1990 (FTFSA) is
before the Senate. A bill to amend the Defense Production Act of 1950 was introduced on February 5,
1991, title IV of which relates to fair trade in financial services. S. 347, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. (1991).
If enacted, the FTFSA would create a framework for negotiations, periodic reports, and discretionary
sanctions to encourage U.S. trading partners to grant national treatment to U.S. banks overseas. The
F[FSA also gives the Secretary discretion to apply sanctions, but does not give private parties the
right to initiate proceedings as is found in the Trade Act. Id. § 15(d). For earlier attempts to add a
threat of retaliation to the national treatment standard, see Orr, Reciprocity and Regulation of Entry,
1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 333, discussing the Breaux Amendment to S. 790, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133
CONG. REC. S3934 (1987), and title IV of the initial version of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness
Act of 1988.
137. U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND Ex-
CHANGE RATE POLICY, OCT. 1988, at 15 (1988) [hereinafter OCT. 1988 REPORT].
138. Exchange Rates and International Economic Policy Coordination Act of 1988, sec. 3001,
(Pub. L. No. 100-418), 102 Stat. 1372, codified at 22 U.S.C. § 5301 (1988)).
139. Id. sec. 3004, 102 Stat. 1373 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 5304 (1988)).
140. Id. sec. 3005, 102 Stat. 1374 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 5305 (1988)).
141. OCT. 1988 REPORT, supra note 137, at 16; REPORT TO CONGRESS ON INTERNATIONAL ECO-
NOMIC AND EXCHANGE RATE POLICY, APR. 1989, at 17 (1989) [hereinafter APR. 1989 REPORT];
REPORT TO CONGRESS ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND EXCHANGE RATE POLICY, OCT. 1989, at 18
[hereinafter OCT. 1989 REPORT]; REPORT TO CONGRESS ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND EXCHANGE
RATE POLICY, APR. 1990, at 16 [hereinafter APR. 1990 REPORT]; REPORT TO CONGRESS ON INTER-
NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND EXCHANGE RATE POLICY, OCT. 1990, at 23 [hereinafter OCT. 1990 REPORT].
142. Liu, supra note 5, at 69, 70.
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remitted into Taiwan, but were required to exchange them for local currency, and
access to foreign currency was strictly supervised to ensure that it was allocated
in accordance with government priorities. 143 In 1987, SAFE was amended and
new regulations were issued permitting outward remittances of up to U.S. $5
million a year and inward remittances of up to U.S. $2 million, subject to minor
qualifications. Remittances of larger amounts still require screening by the au-
thorities. 144 On April 3, 1989, the ROC authorities adopted a new exchange rate
system. Transactions above U.S. $30,000 were to take place at freely determined
rates, while smaller transactions were to take place at rates set with reference to
the freely floating rates. Although a step forward in principle, the implementa-
tion of the new system was seen by U.S. observers as less than desirable.
Responsibility for setting foreign exchange rates shifted from direct official
control by the CBC to indirect official control by government-owned banks,
14 5
and under this new system, less information regarding actual transactions would
be available. 
146
In 1988, the U.S. Treasury Department criticized the ROC for manipulating
the value of its currency to gain trading advantages. According to the report, the
ROC sought a competitive advantage for exports to the United States by keeping
its currency at artificially low levels against the U.S. dollar.'4 7 Even though
ROC authorities permitted the local currency to appreciate 6.5 percent against
the U.S. dollar over the next six months, ROC authorities were again criticized
for not making enough progress in liberalizing foreign exchange markets, and
thus sustaining the massive buildup in ROC foreign exchange reserves.' 48 In
April 1990, the Treasury found that although no evidence existed of direct
exchange rate manipulation, Taiwan's external surplus was so large it raised a
question of indirect manipulation and demonstrated the need for further liberal-
ization of ROC exchange rate policies. 149
143. The severity of this foreign exchange control system was of course substantially lessened by
the presence of a large informal foreign exchange market. The magnitude of such a market can only
be guessed, but anecdotal information indicated that it was substantial. According to one account
prior to the repeal of most foreign exchange regulations, a foreign resident walked into an informal
money changer's office and without any prior arrangement, purchased U.S. $50,000 with local
currency. Goldstein, supra note 65.
144. Liu, supra note 5.
145. For example, the NT$ appreciated sharply following the unfavorable U.S. Treasury report on
currency manipulation by ROC authorities in April 1989, but then remained stable after the Treasury
informed Congress in May 1989 that no further appreciation was necessary. OcT. 1989 REPORT,
supra note 141, at 18.
146. APR. 1989 REPORT, supra note 141, at 19.
147. OcT. 1988 REPORT, supra note 141, at 16; see also Brooks, A "Super 301" Trade Ruling:
Too Early for Seoul and Taipei, HERITAGE FOUND. REP., May 25, 1989, Backgrounder No. 91.
148. APR. 1989 REPORT, supra note 141, at 19. In October 1989, Treasury officials found no clear
indications that Taiwan was manipulating its exchange rate, but declared its intention to continue to
monitor the situation carefully. OcT. 1989 REPORT, supra note 141, at 21.
149. APR. 1990 REPORT, supra note 141, at 19.
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B. DEMAND WITHIN TAIWAN FOR A MORE
COMPETITIVE BANKING INDUSTRY
There are many indicators of public demand in Taiwan for more competitive
banking and financial services. These include the experiences of the trust com-
panies, some of which ignored statutory mandates to the contrary and competed
with commercial banks. The phenomena of deposit-taking by industrial compa-
nies, 1 50 unofficial margin credit for stock market speculation, and the growth of
underground investment companies are some indication of the degree of public
dissatisfaction with the level of financial services available. Continued public
participation in informal financial markets not only poses a threat to the safety
and soundness of the regulated financial system; the predominantly short-term,
high-interest financing available through the informal sector may be inadequate
to meet the needs of Taiwan's maturing economy. A mismatch may arise between
the type of financial services required by more sophisticated trade and industry
in Taiwan and the financing options available in the informal financial market.
The official response to demand for more competitive banking services has
been twofold: to privatize the government-owned banks, and to license new
privately owned commercial banks. These responses are considered in detail in
section III below.
C. DEMAND FROM INVESTORS AND BUSINESSES IN TAIWAN FOR
GREATER ACCESS TO OVERSEAS FINANCIAL SERVICES
During recent decades of rapid economic growth, investors in Taiwan have
accumulated significant financial reserves, and in response to the limited range of
investment alternatives in Taiwan, are now making substantial investments out-
side Taiwan. Families in Taiwan have a very high rate of savings. In 1987, gross
domestic savings were estimated at 40.4 percent of the gross national product.' 51
During the early decades of industrialization, few opportunities for consumption
existed because domestic production was aimed at export markets and domestic
consumption was kept down behind high tariff and other protective barriers
excluding against foreign imports. After severe foreign exchange problems in the
1950s, ROC authorities implemented and maintained a strict regime of foreign
exchange controls. These controls prevented ROC citizens from holding foreign
currency by requiring that all export earnings be converted to local currency. 1
52
150. During a visit to Taipei in 1990, this author learned from several observers that, notwith-
standing the clear prohibition on such activities introduced into articles 29 and 29-1 of the Banking
Law with the 1989 revisions (discussed infra text section III.C), some major companies that have
traditionally relied on deposit-taking from employees as a source of funding continue to do so. This
activity could not persist without the tacit approval of the authorities.
151. ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, TAIWAN COUNTRY PROFILE, 1989-90, at 30 (1991).
152. During the period of strict exchange controls, one of the primary services of the informal
financial system was illicit currency exchange. The amount of assets illicitly accumulated offshore
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Although individuals and businesses have been able to accumulate huge financial
reserves, until recently access to international investment services in Taiwan and
opportunities for direct investment overseas have been severely limited by offi-
cial exchange rate policies. With the reform of ROC foreign exchange regula-
tions, 153 ROC citizens are now permitted to make up to U.S. $5 million in either
direct investment or portfolio investment with minimal official supervision.' 
54
As ROC citizens enjoy greater freedom to travel and invest overseas, local
financial institutions have also expanded into overseas markets. In the last year,
ROC banks have opened seven new branches in the United States. 155 Three
government-owned banks slated for privatization are among those opening
branches, along with the Bank of Taiwan. These branches have opened primarily
to improve the service ROC banks can offer their domestic customers in overseas
markets. 156
III. Policies to Facilitate Internationalization
A. PRIVATIZATION OF GOVERNMENT-OWNED BANKS
A wide-ranging package of reforms was adopted by ROC authorities when the
Banking Law underwent substantial revision in 1989. In response to lobbying
from local business interests represented in the legislature, ROC authorities
finally relaxed their long-standing opposition to competition in banking services.
The authorities committed themselves to privatize government-owned commer-
cial banks. 157 Interest rates have been deregulated, 58 new commercial bank
licenses have been granted to local investors, and the authorized scope of foreign
bank activities has been expanded.' 59 The only unresolved issue is the privati-
zation of the government-owned commercial banks.
Shares in the three major commercial banks were owned not only by the
central government, which sold off its interest in March 1990, but also by the
was a matter of speculation, but it was clearly substantial. For example, two devices were available
to importers and exporters to evade exchange controls. One was falsifying the price stated in customs
documents so that either too little foreign currency would be remitted to Taiwan for exports or too
much foreign currency would be remitted out for imports, with the balance being paid into a foreign
bank account. Another device was the establishment of a Hong Kong trading company that purchased
all exports from the Taiwan operation at a slight markup above cost and resold at contract prices, or
sold imports to the Taiwan operation at a substantial markup over cost, concentrating profits in Hong
Kong where no foreign exchange controls applied. These devices obviously were not available to
ordinary citizens who did not run trading companies.
153. See infra text section II.A.
154. Liu, supra note 5, at 72-74.
155. Kraus, Banks from Smaller Nations in Asia Opening U.S. Offices, AM. BANKER,, Feb. 12,
1991, at 8.
156. Id.
157. Baum, supra note 81.
158. See id.
159. See infra subsection B on new commercial bank licenses and subsection D on foreign banks.
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Taiwan provincial government. 160 The Taiwan provincial government, however,
remains reluctant to relinquish its control over the banks, which constitute a
major source of revenue for local government and patronage for local politicians.
As a result, the three provincial banks must now compete with the newly licensed
privately owned banks while still hobbled by government interference.
Although in some ways the three provincial banks are well positioned to
compete with the newly licensed privately owned commercial banks, in other
respects they will have to struggle. The big three enter the competition with more
than 100 branches each and well-developed ATM systems. 161 The new banks
face a significant problem of staffing, which they are trying to solve by poaching
qualified personnel from any existing commercial banks, whether government or
privately owned. 162 While the big three have established relationships with all
the major business entities on the island, the competition to keep those accounts
will be stiffer. 163
B. LICENSING NEW PRIVATELY OWNED COMMERCIAL BANKS
Prior to the new policy initiatives undertaken by ROC authorities at about the
same time the 1989 Banking Law reforms were enacted, t 64 there was a mora-
torium on granting new commercial bank licenses. 165 From the 1950s to the
current reform, the ROC licensed no major private banks, although several
institutions brought over from mainland China were reactivated during the 1950s
and 1960s. Although various institutions have been allowed to enter the margins
of the banking system in Taiwan, such as the three small, privately owned
commercial banks, 166 the trust and investment companies, and the foreign banks,
government-owned banks have dominated the system since 1949.
Although KMT hostility to private ownership of banks is often justified with
allusions to the Three Principles of the People 167 or to the hyperinflation of the




164. See discussion supra note 157.
165. Wang & Yang, supra note 5, at 28.
166. These are International Commercial Bank of China, United World Chinese Commercial
Bank, and the Shanghai Commercial & Savings Bank, Ltd.
167. The official ideology of the ROC is the "Three Principles of the People" formulated by the
founder of the modem Chinese nation, Dr. Sun Yat-sen. The three principles are democracy, na-
tionalism, and "people's livelihood." "People's livelihood" is somewhat similar to socialism in that
it requires public ownership of certain essential services such as transportation, communication, and
perhaps even banking. Y.S. SUN, THREE PRINCIPLES OF THE PEOPLE 104 (F. Price trans. 1981). See
also Wang & Yang, supra note 5, at 44. Thus the KMT has an ideological mandate to manage certain
economic resources for the public benefit. In the past there was a problem of lack of accountability
in the exercise of this mandate because until 1987 no official political opposition to the KMT was
allowed.
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1940s, government control of banks has important political implications. 168 The
policy against private ownership of banks reflected the concern to retain indirect
control of economic development in Taiwan, where until recent years, the KMT
ran an autocratic state in cooperation with the armed forces and the internal
security apparatus. By retaining control of the financial system, however, the
KMT had an important tool to support its continued dominance in Taiwan. 1
69
Pressures for liberalization and internationalization of the financial system are
now eroding this close connection between political objectives and financial
policies. On July 17, 1989, the ROC president signed into law a major amend-
ment to the Banking Law. 170 Article 52 now authorizes the MOF to issue reg-
ulations governing the licensing of banks. On April 10, 1990, the MOF promul-
gated new regulations titled "Criteria for Establishment of Commercial Banks,"
(Criteria) dealing with the licensing of new private banks. From April 12, 1990,
to October 12, 1990, the MOF accepted a total of nineteen applications for
licenses. On June 26, 1991, the MOF announced fifteen new bank licenses
would be awarded. 171
The standards that the new private banks must meet are contained not only in
the Criteria, but also in the revised Banking Law. Article 25 of the Banking Law
now provides that a single investor will not be permitted to own more than 5
percent of a bank's total shares outstanding.' 72 This is presumably to prevent
control over banking resources from being concentrated in the hands of private
parties outside government control. 173 Banks were formerly required to set aside
20 percent of earnings as a legal reserve, but this requirement has been made
more stringent. Article 50 now provides that a bank must retain 30 percent of
earnings as a legal reserve, and unless the accumulated reserve equals the total
paid in capital, then cash dividends are limited to 15 percent of earnings for the
year. 174
168. For a discussion of the relevance of the experience of hyperinflation, see supra text at notes
17-21.
169. Gold, Entrepreneurs, Multinationals, and the State, in CONTENDING APPROACHES TO THE
POLmCAL ECONOMY OF TAIWAN 200-01 (E. Winckler & S. Greenhalgh eds. 1988).
170. Huang & Sterling, New Amendment Liberalizes Taiwan's Banking Sector, E. ASIAN EXEC.
REP., Aug. 15, 1989, at 8.
171. Baum, Bankers Abound, FAR E. ECON. REV., July 11, 1991, at 35.
172. Banking Law art. 25 now provides:
The shares issued by a Bank shall be registered shares.
Unless otherwise approved by the Central Competent Authority [MOF], the amount of a Bank's shares held by
the same person may not exceed five percent (5%) of the total amount of issued shares of the Bank and the amount
of a Bank's shares held by the same concerned party may not exceed fifteen percent (15%) of such total.
The term, ' isame person," as used herein shall mean the same natural orjuridical person, and the term, "same
concerned party," as used herein shall mean the principal, his/her spouse, blood relatives within the second degree
and enterprises of which the principal or his/her spouse is the responsible person.
If the same person or the same concerned party held shares in excess of the above-stipulated percentages prior
to the enactment of the amendment providing for such percentages, the Central Competent Authority may order
adjustment within a specified period of time.
173. K. Fields, supra note 17, at 83-86.
174. Banking Law art. 50.
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The minimum paid-in capital of the new banks must be NT$10 billion, and
capital contributions of the promoters are limited to cash.' 75 Promoters must
subscribe 80 percent of the required capital amount, while the remaining 20
percent must be offered to the public.1 76 At least NT$2 billion must be fully
subscribed before the promoters can lodge the application with the MOF. 177
The high level of capital required to establish a new commercial bank serves
multiple purposes: to ensure that new banks are established on a sound financial
basis; to limit the number of possible applicants;' 78 and to ensure compliance
with the new 8 percent minimum risk-based capital adequacy standard set by the
Basle Supervisors Committee in 1988.179 Prior to the 1987 amendments, article
44 gave the MOF complete discretion in setting capital adequacy standards.
Article 44 now provides that the ratio between capital owned by the bank and the
assets considered risky shall not be less than 8 percent.1 80
Effective regulation of the new, privately owned commercial banks will be a
major challenge for the ROC authorities. Regardless of whether the standards in
the Banking Law and accompanying regulations are stringent enough to prevent
self-dealing by the management of the new banks, there remains a shortage of
qualified regulatory personnel. 1 8 ' In January 1990, the Department of Monetary
Affairs (DMA) of the MOF had a professional staff of only fifty-seven to regulate
all banks then in existence. 182 After the applications for new bank licenses had
been received, the Minister of Finance announced plans to double the staff of the
DMA. Foreign banks in Taipei are helping to train these new officials.' 8 3
Even a larger and better trained staff at the DMA, together with bank exam-
iners from the CBC, will have a hard time keeping track of management in the
new banks. The high level of capital contribution required to apply for a license
effectively limited the applicant pool to wealthy industrialists. More than three-
175. Deng, Lee & Li, Banking: Criteria for Establishment of New Banks, ASIAN L. & PRAC.,
June 25, 1990, at 42.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Owens, Banking Industry in Taiwan Set for More Competition, Asian Wall St. J., May 28,
1990, at 20.
179. BASLE SUPERVISORS COMM., INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND
CAPITAL STANDARDS (July 1988). The standards set by the Basle Supervisors Committee have no
binding force until adopted by a country. See, e.g., Norton, The Work of the Basle Supervisors
Committee on Bank Capital Adequacy and the July 1988 Report on "International Convergence of
Capital Measurement and Capital Standards," 23 INT'L LAW. 245 (1989).
180. Banking Law art. 44 now provides:
In order to improve the financial structure of Banks, unless otherwise approved by the Central Competent
Authority [MOF], the ratio between equity capital and risk assets of a Bank shall not be less than eight percent
(8%). If the actual such ratio of a Bank is less than such ratio, the Central Competent Authority may prohibit such
Bank from distributing dividends. Applicable regulations with respect to prohibitions on distributing dividends
shall be as prescribed by the Central Competent Authority.
The scope and method of calculating the aforesaid equity capital and risk asset amounts shall be as prescribed
by the Central Component Authority.
181. Baum, supra note 81, at 36.
182. Kaye, Kuo Comes Out Fighting, FAR E. ECON. REV., Jan. 25, 1990, at 53.
183. Baum, supra note 81.
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quarters of the nineteen applications have been received from groups affiliated
with major industrial or commercial conglomerates in Taiwan.184 Although the
Banking Law currently prohibits bank loans to "interested persons," including
related enterprises, the potential for abuse is enormous. '
8 5
A recent scandal involving a cabinet minister's family and local business
leaders illustrates the problems involved with detecting and proving self-dealing.
The scandal involved Ms. Chang Chia-yi, a thirty-four-year-old official at
Tamkiang University and daughter of the former Minister of Communications,
Clement Chang, and one of her colleagues at Tamkiang University, an associate
professor of architecture. The two purchased large blocks of stock in an unlisted
company at a price one-eighth the estimated value of the shares. The shares were
sold to Ms. Chang and her colleague by Hualon Teijran Co., a major company
listed on the stock exchange. Minister Chang's wife was a supervisor of Hualon
Teijran, a position similar to director. The transaction raised questions regarding
the conduct of the listed company in selling a valuable asset for one-eighth its
estimated fair market price. Investigators are also trying to discover how Ms.
Chang and her academic colleague managed to pay the equivalent of U.S. $1
million and U.S. $1.5 million, respectively.' 86
Given the close connection between family and business relationships that is
the norm in Taiwan,1 87 and the generally low standards in accounting and fi-
184. Id.
185. Banking Law art. 32 (as amended through July 17, 1989) provides in relevant part that "[n]o
unsecured credit shall be extended by a Bank to its own responsible person, staff members or any
interested party of its own responsible person or of any such staff member in charge of credit
extensions."
Art. 33 provides:
For any secured credit extended by a Bank to its own responsible person, staff members or any interested party
of its own responsible person or a staff member in charge of credit extensions, the terms thereof shall not be better
than those offered to ordinary borrowers.
The total amount of the aforesaid secured credit shall be as prescribed by the Central Competent Authority after
consultation with the Central Bank of China.
Art. 33-1 provides:
The definition of interested parties as used in the preceding two articles shall mean:
(I) Spouse, relatives by blood within the third degree of relationship or relatives by marriage within the second
degree of relationship of the responsible person of a Bank or of a staff member in charge of credit extensions by
such Bank.
(2) An enterprise solely invested in by or a partnership invested in by the responsible person of a Bank, by a
staff member in charge of credit extensions of such Bank or by an interested party stipulated in Item I of this
Article.
(3) An enterprise of which more than ten percent (10%) of the total issued and outstanding shares or paid-in
capital is solely or totally held by the responsible person of a Bank, by a staff member in charge of credit extensions
of such Bank or by an interested party stipulated in Item I of this Article.
(4) An enterprise invested in by a Bank in which a director, supervisor or manager of such invested enterprise
is the responsible person, a staff member in charge of credit extensions of such Bank or by an interested party
stipulated in Item I of this Article; provided, that such investment and the holding of such concurrent positions has
been approved by the Central competent Authority.
(5) A juridical person or other organization in which the representative or administrator is the responsible person
of a Bank, by a staff member in charge of credit extensions of such Bank or by an interested party stipulated in
Item I of this Article.
186. Mark, Taiwan Government Scandal Exposes Ties between Politics and Big Business, Asian
Wall St. J. Weekly, Mar. 18, 1981, at 19.
187. Greenhalgh, Families and Networks in Taiwan's Economic Development, in CONTENDING
APPROACHES TO THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TAIWAN, supra note 169.
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nancial recordkeeping,188 the possibility of insider trading or self-dealing by
bank management is a real one. It may be difficult or even impossible for an
outsider to reconstruct the chain of events in a complex business transaction
where one motive of the parties was to disguise the true interest in the transaction
by using junior family members as dummy parties.' 89
C. INTEGRATING THE REGULATED AND INFORMAL FINANCIAL SYSTEMS
ROC authorities have dealt with the informal financial system both indirectly,
by encouraging greater competition in the regulated financial system, and also
directly, by trying to prohibit it by law. Although the informal financial system
is composed of a variety of institutions, 190 the UICs have in recent years posed
the most visible threat to the stability of the regulated financial system. Official
efforts to control and diffuse the threat posed by the UICs have unfolded slowly
and cautiously because of a potentially enormous political backlash when inves-
tors are forced to confront the magnitude of their losses.
By accepting funds from the public and investing them in a portfolio of real
and financial assets,191 the UICs were clearly engaged in a form of financial
intermediation similar to a bank or a mutual fund. Because of a loophole in the
law, however, they were not subject to regulation by either the SEC or banking
regulatory authorities such as the MOF or CBC. The ambiguous definition of
"deposit" under the Banking Law permitted the virtually unregulated operation
of the UICs.
188. See infra text section IV.B. It is common knowledge in Taiwan that people in business
maintain two books: one "outside" set of accounts to show the tax authorities (wai zhang), which
presumably understate earnings, and one "inside" (nei zhang) set of accounts that are presumably
accurate. In some respects this system is also the case in the United States, where separate records
are kept for tax accounting purposes and for general accounting purposes. When the ROC tax
authorities review accounts to assess tax liabilities, a red stamp is placed on the accounts to prevent
a later substitution. If a creditor is shown what the borrower represents to be the inside accounts, the
creditor can at least ask to see the outside accounts and ask for an explanation for any major
differences. This raises the possibility that there is also a third set of accounts, which overstates
earnings, prepared for the benefit of creditors.
189. In an interview in April 1985, a foreign bank manager with many years' experience in Taiwan
noted that it is not always necessary for the head of the family to rely on the filial piety of junior
family members in order to hide assets in their names. If the family patriarch takes possession of the
chop or signature seal of a junior family member in whose name substantial assets are kept, then it
becomes difficult if not impossible for the junior family member to alienate the property without the
patriarch's permission.
It is the normal practice to have the imprint of one's seal registered as one's legal signature with
the Bureau of Household Registration in Taiwan. ROC Civil Code bk. I, ch. I, art. 3, para. 2
provides: "If a person uses a seal in lieu of signature, the affixing of such seal is equivalent to a
signature."
190. See supra text at notes 57-58 for a description.
191. To the extent that the principals of UICs were not running legitimate business organizations
at all, they were recycling recent deposits to existing investors as purported dividends and fraudu-
lently siphoning off deposits for their own use. See McGregor, Evidence Belies Company's Boast of
Diverse, Profitable Operations, Asian Wall St. J. Weekly, Nov. 20, 1989, at 22.
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In 1975, when the Banking Law was completely rewritten, a provision was
introduced to regulate deposit-taking activities by nonbanks. 192 Commercial and
industrial enterprises were permitted to receive employee deposits subject to the
qualification that the principals of the business taking the deposits would be
personally liable for the repayment of the amounts deposited. 193 Following the
Cathay Scandal in 1985, these provisions were changed, and revised article 29
states in part: "Unless otherwise provided by law, any organization other than a
bank shall not receive deposits, manage trust funds or public properties as
entrusted, or engage in domestic and foreign remittances." The problem arose
when companies taking what were commonly understood to be deposits styled
these credits as "loans" and argued that article 29 of the Banking Law had no
application. It was under this loophole that the UICs collected, according to
various estimates, the equivalent of U.S. $3-6 billion in deposits from the
public.
With the 1989 revision of the Banking Law, the language of article 29 has
again been substantially revised to facilitate prosecution of illegal deposit-
taking,1 94 and article 29-1 has been added. This new article provides:
Using borrowed money, accepting investments, making the depositor a shareholder or
using other classifications in order to accept deposits or obtain capital from the general
public by agreeing to pay or paying a bonus, interest, share interest or other regard in
an excessive amount, shall be deemed the act of Accepting Deposits. 195
This new definition was aimed at stopping the further expansion of the UICs,
which by the time of this revision had grown to enormous proportions.
Several months after the revised Banking Law went into effect the largest UIC,
known as Hung Yuan or Homey, announced to its investors that their investments
were frozen, but reassured its investors that the only problem was liquidity.
Although it was apparent to outside observers that the UICs had been nothing but
192. The practice of employee deposit-taking by industrial and commercial enterprises was orig-
inally encouraged by ROC authorities to help businesses cope with shortages of credit. See supra text
at notes 61-64.
193. Banking Law art. 29, paras: 1-2 (as amended through 1975) provided:
Unless otherwise provided by law, any organization other than a bank shall not be allowed to receive deposits,
to manage properties of others or to act as agent in handling domestic and foreign remittances. However, this shall
not apply to someone entrusted with funds while acting as a trustee, or to deposits or margin received as part of
a business transaction for a commercial or industrial enterprise, or with the approval of the central competent
authority, an enterprise that receives savings from its own employees.
When a commercial or industrial enterprise is to receive savings from its own employees as provided above, the
responsible person shall be jointly and severally liable for the repayment of such funds. The central competent
authority [MOFI may prescribe regulations for the enforcement of this provision.
194. Banking Law art. 29 (as amended through July 17, 1989), now provides:
Unless otherwise provided by law, any organization other than a Bank shall not accept Deposits, manage Trust
Funds or public property under a mandate or handle domestic or foreign remittances.
Upon a violation of paragraph I of this Article, remedial action shall be taken by the Central Competent
Authority [MOFI or the competent authority in charge of the particular enterprise, together with the juridical police
authority, and the case shall be referred to the court for action. If the organization concerned is a juridical person,
the responsible person shall be jointly and severally liable for the repayment of the relevant obligations.
In performing the duties stipulated above, a suspected party's accounting books and documents may be searched
and detained in accordance with the law, facilities including signs may be tora down and/or other necessary actions
may be taken.
195. Banking Law art. 29-1 (as amended through July 17, 1989).
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Ponzi schemes that inevitably had to collapse once the new banking law shut off
the flow of funds, investors fervently believed that the management of Hung
Yuan would solve its problems. ROC authorities did not want the UICs to
collapse precipitously, however, and thereby lead investors to blame the author-
ities for the collapse rather than the principals of Hung Yuan. Even though Hung
Yuan was able for a while to maintain the impression that it would legalize and
regularize its operations and emerge as a regulated financial institution, it even-
tually collapsed when the principals were arrested in 1990. Some of the princi-
pals were recently convicted and given the heaviest sentences ever handed down
in a case of financial manipulation.' 96 This crackdown on UICs should not be
interpreted as the demise of the informal financial system as a whole, however,
since the UICs were only one segment of the informal system.
In addition to addressing the pressing problem of the UICs, the 1989 revision
of the Banking Law authorized the MOF to issue regulations expanding the scope
of authorized activities of regulated banks. Commercial banks, 197 savings
banks, 198 trust and investment companies, 99 and foreign banks2°° may now
engage in new types of banking business with only the approval of the MOF.
D. NATIONAL TREATMENT FOR FOREIGN BANK BRANCHES IN TAIWAN
On April 10, 1990, the MOF promulgated a revised version of Guidelines for
Screening and Approval of Establishment of Branches and Representative Of-
fices by Foreign Banks (Guidelines). 20' The purpose of the Guidelines is to
expand the scope of permissible activities of foreign banks operating in Taiwan,
to permit the establishment of more branch offices in Taiwan, and to relax the
standards for establishing branches or representative offices in Taiwan.2 °2
The expanded scope of foreign bank branch activities in Taiwan now includes
taking savings deposits, lending long-term, and managing trust funds. 20 3 The
Guidelines also permit foreign bank branches to underwrite and deal in all types
of securities. 204 The ceiling for the total amount of deposits a foreign bank can
receive in Taiwan has been increased from 12.5 to 15 times its paid-in capital. 20 5
Foreign banks are now permitted to establish up to three branches a year in
Taiwan and are given more flexibility in deciding where to locate these new
196. Mark, Sentencing of Hung Yuan Officers Sends Warning to Taiwan Investors, Asian Wall St.
J. Weekly, Apr. 8, 1991, at 11.
197. Banking Law art. 71(14).
198. Id. art. 78(16).
199. Id. art. 101(15).
200. Id. art. 121.
201. Huang & Chen, Taiwan Revises Regulations for Admitting Foreign Banks, E. ASIAN EXEC.
REP., Sept. 15, 1990, at 19. The 1990 Foreign Bank Guidelines appear in E. ASIAN EXEC. REP.,
Sept. 15, 1990, at 24 [hereinafter 1990 Foreign Bank Guidelines].
202. 1990 Foreign Bank Guidelines, supra note 201.
203. Id. art. 12, paras. 1-2, 10.
204. Id. para. 9.
205. Id. art. 14.
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branches. The new limit of three a year is an improvement on the limitation in
the 1983 version of the Guidelines, which permitted a total of only two branches,
one in Taipei and one in Kaohsiung. The new Guidelines provide that the
branches may be established in Taipei, Kaohsiung, or some other place agreed to
by the MOF. This standard was adopted in 1986 to give foreign banks the option
of establishing branches in the Export Processing Zones. 20 6 The new Guidelines
still restrict expansion to foreign banks that have operated for five years without
a violation of the ROC Banking Law in the most recent year.20 7
The new Guidelines, while relaxing the standard for permitting a foreign bank
to establish a branch or representative office, added some new requirements.
20 8
One new requirement permits foreign banks to open offices in Taiwan only if the
bank has had no violation of ROC banking law for the previous five years. Now,
however, a foreign bank need only be among the 500 largest in the world to
qualify to establish a branch. Furthermore, foreign banks may gain admittance to
Taiwan by merging with a bank holding an established branch or by absorbing
the branch of a wholly owned subsidiary.
The revised Guidelines represent substantial progress toward national treat-
ment for U.S. banks in Taiwan. Although they are still subject to cumbersome
regulations regarding increased branch operations and scope of business, the
current standards are dramatically more flexible and fair than the rigid guidelines
applied in the early 1980s.
E. PERMITTING THE FREE FLOW OF INVESTMENT
CAPITAL INTO AND OUT OF TAIWAN
Although Taiwan's economic miracle was based on international trade, until
very recently its capital markets were kept isolated from international financial
market pressures by extensive government regulation of capital flows into and
out of Taiwan. Regulations governing foreign exchange transactions and foreign
investment allowed ROC authorities to exercise significant control over the type
and volume of capital flows. Liberalization and internationalization of Taiwan's
financial markets will require ROC authorities to relinquish this control and
permit market forces, in Taiwan and internationally, to determine the content of
investment decisions. In recent years, ROC authorities have taken substantial
steps toward relinquishing control over capital flows, but a free market does not
yet prevail.
From 1954 to 1990, direct foreign investment in Taiwan was regulated by the
Statute for Investment by Foreign Nationals (SIFN). 2 09 For investments to con-
form to the provisions of SIFN, foreign investors were required to apply to ROC
206. Id. arts. 7-8.
207. Id. art. 9.
208. Id. arts. 3-4.
209. Liu, supra note 5, at 71.
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authorities for approval. Once this approval had been obtained, foreign investors
enjoyed certain rights to repatriate profits and were exempt from certain regu-
lations that applied to similar domestic enterprises. Until the early 1980s, ap-
proval was granted only to applications in conformity with official economic
policy objectives, such as manufacturing for export. From the 1960s until the
statute's expiration in 1990, investors could also enjoy certain tax benefits if their
investment met the requirements of the Statute for Encouragement of Investment
(SEI). The SEI has now been replaced by the Statute for Upgrading Industries,
which relies less on incentives for manufacturing and offers different tax benefits
to foreign investors.
While this complex incentive and regulatory structure still applies to approved
foreign investment in Taiwan, the reform of the foreign exchange regulations has
created another legal opportunity for repatriation of investments. Under the
regulations governing outward remittances, foreign investors who have not ob-
tained official approval may nevertheless remit up to U.S. $5 million a year in
repatriated profits or capital.
An offshore banking market was established in Taiwan in 1984, but it has
remained small and underdeveloped. 210 The Act for Offshore Banking Opera-
tions permits the establishment of offshore banking units by banks doing busi-
ness in Taiwan and was patterned after similar arrangements in Hong Kong and
Singapore.211 If the restriction on the exchange of currency by offshore banking
units were lifted, the offshore banking market might play a significant role in
internationalizing Taiwan's financial system.
The most dramatic recent progress in the internationalization of Taiwan's
financial markets has taken place not in the banking system, but in securities
markets. The internationalization of the TSE began under careful government
supervision in the early 1980s when foreign financial institutions were permitted
to organize and offer overseas mutual funds of stocks listed on the exchange.
212
The second phase of internationalization, permitting direct foreign investment in
the TSE, was to have begun in 1986 but was delayed by officials concerned about
the magnitude of speculative funds already flowing into the stock market. Fi-
nally, in the summer of 1990, the Minister of Finance announced that certain
designated foreign investors would be allowed to make direct investments in the
TSE.2 13
The Regulations Governing Securities Investment by Overseas Chinese and
Foreign Investors and Procedures for Remittance have been amended, but the
scope of the amendments is still quite limited and the response by foreign
210. Clinton & Hewes, The Offshore Banking Law and the Foreign Investor, E. AsIAN ExEc.
REP., July 15, 1985, at 9.
211. Id.
212. Liu, Securities Market-Opening Measures: An Analysis, E. ASIAN Exac. REP., Jan. 15,
1991, at 9.
213. Id.
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investors has been less than that envisaged by the authorities.2 14 Only substantial
banks, insurance companies, and fund management companies are permitted to
participate in the program, and investment may only be in designated instru-
ments. 215 Total foreign ownership of TSE companies is subject to ceilings, and
all investment under the program is subject to a ceiling of U.S. $2.5 billion. 2 16
Inward remittances to fund participation in the program must be made within a
limited period following approval of an application to participate, and outward
remittances are also severely restricted.217 The new program is clearly designed
to operate as a pilot program to allow ROC officials time to prepare for expand-
ing securities markets further. Since the current program is subject to so many
restrictions, it will be of interest only to a limited number of foreign investors.218
IV. Some Realism about the Internationalization
of Banking in Taiwan
The ROC legal system is contained within a matrix of social and political
institutions, and its ability to support reforms aimed at liberalizing and interna-
tionalizing the financial system will depend in part on its coherence and integrity
as a part of this larger social matrix. Enacting statutes aimed at liberalizing and
internationalizing the financial system may be difficult because the ROC legal
system is not well-developed and its autonomy is often subject to strong pres-
sures from other social or political institutions. Until the development of an
autonomous, authoritative legal system is included in reform agendas, the ap-
pearance of liberalization or internationalization will be belied in fact.
Since in the 1970s, and at an accelerating pace since martial law was repealed
in 1987, the ROC government has been moving away from authoritarian rule in
Taiwan. As the KMT relies less on Leninist political strategies and military
power to guarantee its continued rule, politics and society in Taiwan are opening
up to an unprecedented degree. New institutional arrangements will have to be
forged to replace one party rule and martial law, but there is no guarantee that
those institutions will be legal institutions. Japan, the former colonial ruler of
Taiwan from 1895 to 1945, continues to exert a powerful influence and Japanese
economic and political practices may offer an alternative model for Taiwan to
follow. Taiwan might successfully imitate the Japanese system of informal bu-
reaucratic alternatives to litigation and legalistic economic regulations. If Taiwan
follows the Japanese example, it might, like Japan, forestall almost indefinitely
the creation of an autonomous, authoritative legal system while still enjoying
continued economic development.
214. Mark & Levingston, Foreign Fund Managers Criticize Taiwan Move to Attract Investors,
Asian Wall St. J. Weekly, Sept. 24, 1990, at 31.
215. Liu, supra note 212.
216. Mark & Levingston, supra note 214.
217. Liu, supra note 212.
218. Id.
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A. ENHANCING THE CREDIBILITY OF THE
LEGAL SYSTEM THROUGH THE
CREATION OF A MULTIPARTY DEMOCRACY
Although the political system of Taiwan is now in the process of rapid trans-
formation, 21 9 it historically has been largely a one-man, one-party dictatorship.
Under such a dictatorship, the legal system has had limited importance in com-
parison to security organs, the executive branch of government, and the ruling
party.220 The KMT sowed the seeds for resistance to its authority in 1947 by
suppressing a local popular uprising with heavy loss of life. 221 Following the
KMT retreat to Taiwan in 1949, an uneasy compromise evolved in which the
majority Taiwanese population was permitted economic opportunities in ex-
change for continued domination of the government and military by the minority
mainland Chinese refugee elite.222 This benevolent dictatorship began to evolve
toward a liberal democracy in the 1970s with the policy of Taiwanization-the
promotion of local Taiwanese to positions of responsibility in the government
and KMT. 223 President Chiang Ch'ing-kuo's repeal of martial law on July 15,
1987, represented only one of many steps the ROC authorities had taken since the
1970s to reform their autocratic rule on Taiwan. The progress toward democracy
is not complete, however, and the KMT continues to manipulate the political
system to maintain its rule in the face of increasing political opposition.22 4 As a
result, the political system in Taiwan may never evolve into a U.S.-style mul-
tiparty democracy, but instead may come to resemble the Japanese dominant
party system.
225
Although the political opposition was legalized in 1988 and reorganized as the
Democratic Progress Party, it still suffers from several important disadvantages
compared to the ruling KMT.2 2 6 In elections, the KMT enjoys preferential access
to mass media because all television and radio stations are government-owned
and KMT controlled. There have been allegations of KMT vote buying and vote
fraud in recent elections. While the Election and Recall Law prohibits formal
219. Mark, Taiwan's Ruling Kuomintang Approves Proposed Constitutional Amendments, Asian
Wall St. J. Weekly, Apr. 1, 1991, at 1.
220. Winckler, Institutionalization and Participation on Taiwan: From Hard to Soft Authoritar-
ianism?, 99 CHINA Q. 481 (1984).
221. Taiwanese people rose up to protest the mismanagement and corruption of the KMT-installed
military governor, who took over after the Japanese ceded Taiwan back to the Chinese. See G. KERR,
FORMOSA BETRAYED (1965).
222. T.J. Cheng, Democratizing the Quasi-Leninist Regime in Taiwan, WORLD POLrrCs, Apr.
1989, at 481-82.
223. T. GOLD, supra note 2, at 114.
224. McGregor, Time for Political Cooperation in Taiwan, Asian Wall St. J. Weekly, Dec. 11,
1989, at 13.
225. Baum, Top Gun, Loose Cannon, FAR E. ECON. REv., Apr. 11, 1991, at 24.
226. McGregor, New Election Laws in Taiwan Squelch Opposition Efforts, Asian Wall St. J.
Weekly, Feb. 20, 1989, at 1; Election Hearings, supra note 13, at 7.
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campaigning until ten days before the election, KMT incumbents are able to
circumvent this restriction. On the eve of an election, the KMT has the ability to
move members of the armed forces, its strongest supporters, to different resi-
dences to permit them to vote in elections where opposition candidates appear
likely to win. Finally, because the ROC claims to represent all China, more than
half of all elected representatives do not run for reelection at all because they
claim to represent parts of mainland China where elections cannot be held. Until
the KMT permits free and fair elections, the ROC government will remain more
accountable to the mainlander minority, the KMT, and the military than to the
public at large. Attempts at liberalizing or internationalizing the banking system
will be undermined by these distortions in the legislative process.
The political pressure undermining the autonomy and impartiality of the legal
system is further increased by the fact that the KMT is not just a political party,
but one of the largest "private" investors in Taiwan. The KMT has cemented its
dominant position on Taiwan by making substantial investments in almost every
sector of the local economy.227 One recent estimate by an opposition politician
of the value of government and KMT controlled assets was U.S. $380 billion.
This base of economic resources permits the KMT to supplement its diminished
control over the electoral process with patronage benefits. It can influence the
nature of legislation by granting monopoly licenses to government-controlled
entities. This issue has been raised in the context of banking reform because the
KMT is among the applicants for one of the new commercial bank licenses, a
move that has sparked considerable public controversy.228 Until the KMT divests
itself of its substantial economic holdings, political opposition will remain at a
severe disadvantage, and the process of formulating official economic policy will
be tainted by the possibility of self-dealing.
Although in some respects, the ROC political system resembles that of the
United States, Taiwan also has close historical, social, and economic affinities
with Japan. The Japanese political system may offer a model that can more
easily be adapted to the current circumstances of Taiwan than the highly legal-
istic, multiparty system of the United States. The dominant party political sys-
tem of Japan, in which the Liberal Democratic Party has enjoyed uninterrupted
rule since World War II, achieves representation of different interests by building
coalitions of different factions within the ruling party, rather than alternating the
party in control. 229 The legal system in Japan does not play the same role in
mediating between the government and the people that the U.S. legal system
plays. The exchange of ideas and the exercise of power instead take place
through informal channels through a practice described as "bureaucratic infor-
227. Taipei Moves to Trim Its Business Empire, but the KMT's Critics Aren't Appeased, Asian
Wall St. J. Weekly, Oct. 9, 1989, at 17.
228. Baum, Nationalist Asset?, FAR E. ECON. REV., Sept. 20, 1990, at 70.
229. G. CURriS, THE JAPANESE WAY OF POLMCS (1988).
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malism." 230 Bureaucratic informality consists of practices such as "administra-
tive guidance" and a preference for mediation and informal negotiations rather
than litigation or codifying and limiting government policy through formal reg-
ulations. The Japanese legal system plays a marginal role at best in articulating
and enforcing government policy.
While bureaucratic informality has apparently facilitated economic growth in
postwar Japan, it can constitute a serious obstacle to liberalization and interna-
tionalization of the domestic economy. The recent scandal involving major se-
curities firms in Japan reimbursing only selected clients for trading losses high-
lights how substantial the differences are between economic regulation
conducted through bureaucratic informality and economic regulation conducted
through more formal legalistic means. 23 1 The confidence of investors in the
integrity of the Tokyo stock market has been eroded by disclosures that the
largest brokerages in Japan favor certain customers by compensating them for
their losses, apparently with the knowledge and acquiescence of officials at the
Ministry of Finance. The scandal has brought to the surface practices that were
apparently routine, but shielded from public view in part by informal regulatory
practices. Foreign investors have responded by calling for greater fairness and
transparency in Japanese securities industries dealings, which would presumably
include more formal regulations, fewer informal negotiations and compromises,
and more rigorous enforcement of existing regulations.2 32
Several important changes will have to take place in Taiwan before the Jap-
anese practices of bureaucratic informality and dominant party democracy could
be implemented. Under martial law, the ruling party in Taiwan enjoyed consid-
erable autonomy from local political conflicts. 233 With the repeal of martial law
and the opening up of civil society in Taiwan, the KMT is now being forced to
find new channels of communication between the central government and local
interests. Patronage systems that formerly operated at the local level will have to
be reformulated into national factions, and the processes of negotiation and
compromise will have to be regularized. The difficulties experienced by KMT
candidates in 1989 elections demonstrated how inadequate existing systems of
patronage and corruption have become in meeting the challenge of a more open
political system. 234 The continued dominance of the KMT in Taiwan will depend
on how successfully party leaders are able to forge new alliances with local
business interests, and develop practices similar to the Japanese "administrative
guidance," which facilitates informal, behind-the-scenes cooperation between
bureaucrats, politicians, and business interests.
230. F. UPHAM, LAW AND SOCIETY IN POSTWAR JAPAN (1987).
231. Rowley, Umpire and Coach, FAR E. ECON. REV., July 25, 1991, at 59.
232. Id.
233. K. Fields, supra note 17, at 65.
234. Kaye, Bad Losers, FAR E. ECON. REV., Aug. 31, 1989, at 15.
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B. ESTABLISHING THE INSTITUTIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE
FOR SOUND FINANCIAL MARKEs
Financial markets are administered by people, and the professionalism and
training of those individuals are essential elements in maintaining the integrity of
those markets. Taiwan suffers from a severe shortage of accounting and legal
professionals with the type of training that would qualify them to help develop
and liberalize local financial markets. Not only does the number of qualified
professionals need to be raised, but the standards that those professions apply
need to be reexamined.
The poor reputation suffered by the accounting profession in Taiwan is due in
part to a shortage of qualified personnel and to the incomplete specification of the
standards to be applied. A 1983 survey indicated that as many as 80 percent of
local CPAs were retired military or government personnel with training and
experience in accounting for governmental entities, not private businesses. 235
The problem of a large number of CPAs with qualifications not directly relevant
to the expansion of private sector finance is compounded by an artificially low
pass rate on the CPA examination for students graduating from Taiwan's regular
business faculties.2 36 The professional standards of the accounting profession are
low because legal liability is unlikely to result from certification of false or
misleading financial statements.237 Systemic tax evasion within the private sector
can only be maintained through cooperation between accountants and managers,
and a profession of underground accountants has emerged to meet the demand
for keeping duplicate books. 238 Even reputable accountants have only vague
standards with which to work, as evidenced by the National Federation of CPA
Associations of the ROC's published accounting and auditing standards, which
total only thirty-four pages, as compared with thousands of pages for the U.S.
equivalent.
239
A flow of reliable information between participants is necessary to the devel-
opment of a modem banking system. Until the accounting profession expands
the number of qualified CPAs and raises its professional standards, financial
235. Shao, Taiwan: CPAs underfire, Asian Wall St. J. Weekly, June 27, 1983 (originally cited in
R. WADE, supra note 2).
236. The pass rate increased from 1 percent in 1980 to 20 percent in 1989. J.M.M. Li, Disorder
in the Counting House, in FINANCIAL AND INVESTMENT YEARBOOK, ROC 1991, at 122.
237. According to one foreign accountant doing business in Taiwan, a local bank sued a local
accounting firm for negligently having certified a false financial statement. The court held that
because the bank had not relied exclusively on the financial statement, the accounting firm could not
be held liable even though the statement included false information. While under ROC law, judicial
decisions do not generally have precedential value and are not usually published, this accountant
recalled that the defendant accounting firm took the unusual step of mailing copies of the judgment
to various parties to inform them of the holding.
238. Wou Young-Ie, The Informal Sector in the Construction Industry in Taiwan: A Case Study
of an Informal Contractor (1982) (unpublished M. Arch. thesis, U.C. Berkeley).
239. R. WADE, supra note 2, at 269.
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markets in Taiwan will be forced to continue to operate with only inadequate and
imperfect financial information. 240
Until recently, the legal profession in Taiwan, like the accounting profession,
was understaffed and dominated by retired military personnel. The majority of
licensed lawyers in Taiwan today received their training in the military. Taiwan
has several methods to gain admission to the bar, and historically, passing the bar
exam was by far the most difficult. Until 1989, the pass rate hovered around 1
percent of the approximately 3,000 students who sat for the exam each year.24 1
Other methods include service as a military officer with legal responsibilities
after having received training from the law faculty of a military college, or
earning a Ph.D. in law and teaching in a law school for a designated period of
time. 242 While lawyers with legal training in the military will be well-equipped
to handle a law practice based on litigation and lobbying, such lawyers will not
generally be well-equipped to cope with a sophisticated transactional practice.
Recent moves to permit the brightest graduates of Taiwan's regular law faculties
to pass the bar exam represent a significant concession toward creating a bar
capable of handling sophisticated financial transactions.
The ROC legal system seems poorly integrated into the fabric of society in
Taiwan, and the shortage of legal personnel is only partially responsible. From
a cynical perspective, the ROC legal system seems designed not to encourage
compliance with the law, but rather to embody a threat of official sanctions that
can be manipulated by various actors to secure economic or political advan-
tages.243 Legislation is often based on inflexible formal standards demanding
more compliances than can reasonably be expected. An example of this exists in
a provision of Company Law stating that no incorporated entity can engage in
activities that have not been specified in its articles of incorporation and approved
by the relevant authority.244 In practice, local authorities are often unwilling to
grant permission for a wide range of economic activities for which there is public
demand. To circumvent the law, a company will seek permission to engage in a
form of business activity that will be readily permitted (selling refreshments, for
example) and then proceed to engage in whatever business seems likely to be
profitable (a Karaoke245 parlor, for example). This inflexibility contrasts with
240. One indication of the magnitude of the problem is the recent estimate by the chairman of the
Environment Foundation that the revenue of informal or underground business in Taiwan was equiv-
alent to 55 percent of the gross national product of the ROC. Taiwan's Black Market Rides Roughshod
Over Local Economy, Bus. TAIWAN, May 21-27, 1990, at 1.
241. The pass rate for the annual bar examinations administered in 1989 and 1990 increased to
approximately 10 percent.
242. In recent years, the procedure for converting an academic law qualification into admission
to the ROC bar by teaching in a law school has been tightened up.
243. For a similar interpretation of the role of law in modem Japan, see F. UPHAM, supra note 230.
244. Company Law arts. 6, 129.
245. Karaoke is Japanese for "empty voice," and is the name of a type of sound system devel-
oped in Japan in the 1960s. A karaoke system includes a microphone and background music, and was
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equivalent provisions in the company law of most American states, where a
company can incorporate with the stated intention of engaging in any lawfulbusiness. 2 46
Confronted with rigid standards out of conformity with social reality, those
charged with enforcing the law have the option of overextending resources to
achieve compliance, disregarding the law, or bargaining with those affected to
waive its provisions unofficially, possibly in exchange for some private benefit.
A rigid legal system that incorporates few flexible standards and that appears, in
many instances, not designed to be enforced, reinforces the extralegal influence
of government officials. Reforming the ROC legal system to take account, for
example, of the ideas of the U.S. Legal Realist Movement 247 of the 1920s and
1930s would substantially erode the extralegal discretion now enjoyed by ROC
government officials. The extralegal discretion currently exercised by ROC of-
ficials lacks even the checks and balances present in the Japanese system of
bureaucratic informality. While Japanese statutes are often drafted as aspirational
statements, as the concrete import of regulation is worked out in informal ne-
gotiations, ROC statutes often simply fail to conform to reality and any coop-
eration between regulatory personnel and the public is carried on at a level even
more obscure than that of "administrative guidance" in Japan.
C. EFFEcr OF LACK OF DE JURE SOVEREIGNTY
No issue of national policy is ever simple in Taiwan, because the ROC is not
a nation like other nations. Both the PRC and the ROC claim to be the sole
legitimate government for all of China. Although ROC claims to retake the
mainland have been abandoned in recent years, the PRC has never renounced its
option to use force to reunite Taiwan with the mainland. The ROC enjoys
diplomatic relations with a dwindling number of small nations, and the few
remaining significant powers that recognize the ROC are now reconsidering their
position. 24
8
The ROC has shown considerable flexibility in its diplomatic policy in recent
years, but the PRC has been slow to follow suit. In his inaugural statement, ROC
President Lee Teng-hui announced that his government would be willing to
engage in academic, cultural, economic, and technological exchanges with the
originally used in nightclubs where individuals would take turns performing for the audience. See,
e.g., Zibart, Adventures in Dining, Washington Post, Apr. 12, 1991, at N10. Karaoke bars in Taipei
have many small rooms with comfortable chairs and large-screen televisions, and patrons request
music videos with background music and subtitled lyrics that they sing along with in the company
of a few friends.
246. MODEL BustNEss CORP. ACT § 3.04 (1990).
247. W. TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT (1973).
248. In 1990, Saudi Arabia recognized the PRC, leaving South Africa and South Korea as the only
significant official allies of the ROC. Singapore was considering switching recognition to the PRC.
Baum, Shifting Sands, FAR E. ECON. REV., Aug. 2, 1990, at 49.
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PRC if the PRC would implement a democratic political order, establish a free
market economic system, and renounce the use of force to retake Taiwan. 249 The
ROC now permits its citizens to visit the mainland with few restrictions, having
lifted a ban on such visits in 1988. The ROC authorities also tacitly acknowledge
a growing trade with the mainland conducted indirectly through Hong Kong
affiliates. Furthermore, an ROC delegation attended the 1989 meeting of the
Asian Development Bank in Beijing, even though there has been no official
cessation of hostilities between the two countries.
Overtures by President Lee Teng-hui to Communists on the mainland have
produced only ambivalent responses. In 1990, the Communists initiated large-
scale troop movements in the Fujian province across the Taiwan straits from
Taiwan. The PRC Central Bank ordered China's financial institutions to halt
business dealings with the Bank of Tokyo after the Japanese bank opened a
representative office in Taipei in May 1990. The Bank of Tokyo had been the first
Japanese bank to open an office in Taiwan in thirty years. Dai-ichi Kangyo Bank,
which has had an office in Taiwan since 1959, has no presence on mainland
China as a result of the PRC's policy. 250 Further, the PRC continues to oppose
ROC membership in international organizations such as GATT.
The authority of the ROC legal system is undermined not only by domestic
political pressures, but also by the lack of de jure sovereignty. Until now, ROC
authorities have managed to navigate the uncharted waters of Taiwan's unique
international status with success, but political decisions within Taiwan are always
made with the specter of an invasion from the mainland in mind. If Taiwan were
a sovereign nation, then political democratization and liberalization of the eco-
nomic order could develop, subject to the constraints of domestic opinion and the
international economic order. One internal political agenda that might emerge in
an open political system would be the demand for full national sovereignty,
perhaps as the Republic of Taiwan. Given the ambivalent attitude of the Com-
munists toward Taiwan generally and the repeated assertions that PRC leaders
will not permit Taiwan to become an independent sovereign state, 25 1 KMT
authorities have not been willing to permit open discussion on this point.
Not only is democracy in Taiwan undermined by the threat of invasion from
mainland China. The threat of invasion also appears to have undermined the
loyalty of some ROC government officials. Given that the Communists have
indicated a willingness to negotiate with the KMT, but not with a sovereign
government of Taiwan, many residents of Taiwan fear that KMT leaders would
sell out Taiwan in exchange for Communist support for their continued dominant
position. Another fear is that the ROC government would not mobilize to resist
249. H. Chiu, Constitutional and Political Reform, in The Republic of China and Taiwan-
Mainland Relations (Apr. 12, 1991) (paper presented at Association of Asian Studies Annual Meeting).
250. China Stops Business with Tokyo Bank, ABA BANKING J., Sept. 1990, at 8.
251. CENTER FOR TAIWAN INT'L RELATIONS, LET TAIWAN BE TAIWAN 61-71 (M. Cohen & E. Teng
eds. 1990).
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a serious threat from the mainland. While it is against government policy for
ROC government officials to obtain "green cards" (permanent resident status in
the United States), many local observers believe the practice is widespread.
Furthermore, the same government officials may have followed the common
practice of sending children to countries like the United States for education, or
having close relatives settle and purchase real estate in foreign countries. The risk
of having a government staffed with individuals holding permanent residence
status in foreign countries, or having family and property in those countries, is
that if faced with a serious possibility of invasion, the government would crum-
ble and disappear. The perception that government personnel lack a sincere
commitment to the long-term well-being of Taiwan and the Taiwanese people
undermines any disposition to work for long-term financial or legal institutional
development. This perception may be assuaged, however, by the recent an-
nouncement of a multibillion-dollar plan to upgrade Taiwan's infrastructure.
2 5 2
The primary goal of political leaders in Taiwan is not simply to liberalize and
internationalize Taiwan's economic order, but to preserve Taiwan's existence in
its current form. Given how successfully Taiwan has coped with the problems
arising from the lack of de jure sovereignty, it remains possible that Taiwan will
continue to achieve remarkable economic results and that the financial system of
Taiwan will be more fully integrated into Taiwan's international success.
V. Conclusion
The current changes in banking and finance in Taiwan are only part of a larger
process of social and political transformation now taking place. Under an official
policy to liberalize and internationalize the financial system of Taiwan, the ROC
authorities are taking slow steps toward reform. The question of how committed
ROC authorities really are to this policy cannot be answered without considering
what kind of system ROC authorities and the people of Taiwan will develop for
regulating Taiwan's future development. The outcome of larger political ques-
tions, such as what form Taiwan's emerging democratic institutions will take,
will determine much of the outcome of more specific questions of economic
regulation such as how vigorously internationalization will be pursued in finan-
cial markets.
ROC authorities need not necessarily follow the U.S. model of multiparty de-
mocracy and independent, highly developed legal institutions in order to deliver a
rising standard of living to the people of Taiwan. Informal techniques of bureaucratic
cooperation with business leaders applied in postwar Japan have produced sustained
economic growth and political stability. Yet society in Taiwan differs substantially
from both the United States and Japan, and neither model of economic development
could be implemented without major changes taking place in Taiwan.
252. Mark, Taiwan's Premier Hau Hopes to Make Historical Mark with Massive Projects, Asian
Wall St. J. Weekly, Feb. 18, 1991, at 2.
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Society in Taiwan has been labeled "chaotic" and "anarchic" by some observ-
ers. 253 Strong allegiances to family groups undermines loyalty to other institutions,
such as the nation or a corporate employer. Subethnic rivalry between Taiwanese and
Mainlanders 2 54 and lack of de jure sovereignty further undermine a sense of com-
mon destiny such as the Japanese share. Substantial new avenues of cooperation will
have to be developed before the ROC officials can hope to enjoy the sort of com-
promise and cooperation that government officials in Japan can expect. On the other
hand, ROC legal institutions lack the popular support and heritage of independence
and integrity enjoyed by legal institutions in the United States. Having been first a
colony of Japan and then ruled by martial law, Taiwan lacks a history of democratic
political institutions to draw on in building a vital multiparty democracy. Existing
local patronage systems could develop into organized national intraparty factions
along the lines of the LDP in Japan more easily than they could develop into a
vigorous participatory democracy. With no tradition of democracy to sacrifice, the
Taiwanese public may be willing to acquiesce in continued elite rule if that elite is
able to continue to deliver a rising standard of living without a return to overt
political oppression to remain in control.
If Taiwan develops a system of law and government similar to that of Japan,
then formal regulations will not play a decisive role in determining the future
development of financial markets. ROC officials in cooperation with local busi-
ness elites could retain effective control of the regulatory process, diminishing
the ability of small local investors or foreign participants to have much impact on
significant decisions. As is arguably the case in Japan, the veneer of interna-
tionalization may serve to obscure the informal exercise of discretion rather than
to permit greater access for the Taiwanese public and foreign participants.
Whether the ROC authorities try to follow the example of the United States or that
of Japan, some significant changes will have to take place in coming years in order
for the financial system to meet the needs of Taiwan's continued economic devel-
opment. The existing bifurcated approach of overregulation of major banking insti-
tutions and underregulation of the Taiwan Stock Exchange and the informal financial
system will only serve to inhibit Taiwan's further development. What Fields has
labeled a policy of "public restrictions, private disregard" or what the Economist
has labeled "a murky half-light between freedom and state control" will have to be
displaced by new institutional arrangements for financial regulation. 255 Whether the
two approaches are synthesized in a legalistic approach consistent with genuine
internationalization or an informal approach that will continue to exclude foreign
participation remains to be seen.
253. Tanzer, Taiwan's long march toward democracy, FORBES, Apr. 3, 1989, at 48.
254. The largest subethnic group in Taiwan are the Taiwanese, settlers who came from mainland
China in the 18th and 19th centuries and speak the Hakka Chinese dialect. "Mainlander" refers to
the refugees from the Communist defeat on the mainland, who came to Taiwan around 1949, speak
the Mandarin dialect, and who historically have dominated the ROC government and the KMT.
255. K. Fields, supra note 17, at 143; ECONOMIST, Mar. 28, 1987, cited in K. Fields, supra note
17, at 144.
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